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INTRODUCTION
The Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements (“Convention”
or “Choice of Court Convention”) aspires to be one of the most signiﬁcant
private international law treaties of this century. The Convention would
substantially alter existing rules in many jurisdictions, including the United
States, governing the recognition and enforcement of both international
choice-of-court agreements and judgments obtained in proceedings based on
such agreements. The Convention’s drafters and other proponents promote it
as replicating both the terms and success of the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York
Convention”), transposed to cross-border forum selection agreements.
Despite these aspirations, little critical assessment of the Convention’s
terms or eﬀects has been undertaken. Both scholarly commentary and oﬃcial
explanatory reports are almost entirely descriptive or promotional. There
have been virtually no serious eﬀorts to evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of the
Convention or the wisdom of its fundamental structure and terms.
Despite its obvious good intentions, there are substantial grounds for
doubting the wisdom of the Convention, both for the United States and other
jurisdictions. The Convention transplants basic principles from the New York
Convention to the context of cross-border choice-of-court agreements,
notwithstanding substantial diﬀerences between the arbitral process and
proceedings in (many) national courts. These diﬀerences raise serious doubts
as to the beneﬁts of the Choice of Court Convention’s basic terms and
objective; in particular, there are very substantial grounds for questioning
whether it is wise, in the context of a global convention, to treat choice-ofcourts agreements and national court judgments in the same manner as
international commercial arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. The
Choice of Court Convention also omits significant safeguards that the New
York Convention and most national legal systems incorporate, which ensure
that both the parties’ autonomy and the procedural integrity of the
adjudicative process are respected. In doing so, the structure and terms of the
Choice of Court Convention again raises serious doubts as to both the benefits
it would produce and the fairness of proceedings under the Convention.

2021]

The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements

2081

This Article seeks to provide an objective assessment of the Choice of
Court Convention’s structure and terms, evaluating the costs and beneﬁts to
the United States and other jurisdictions’ ratiﬁcation of the Convention. Part
I of the Article summarizes the negotiating history of the Convention and
the aspirations of its proponents. Part II of the Article outlines the
Convention’s basic terms, including comparisons with the principal
provisions of the New York Convention. Part III of the Article evaluates the
Choice of Court Convention, focusing in particular on its provisions dealing
with the parties’ autonomy and the procedural integrity of the adjudicative
process. The Article concludes that, in both respects, the Convention fails to
provide counterparts to the safeguards of the New York Convention and
existing U.S. law and it appears likely to expose parties to signiﬁcant risks of
unfairness and ought not be ratiﬁed by nations committed to the rule of law.
I. THE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION: ORIGINS AND
NEGOTIATIONS
The Choice of Court Convention was drafted under the auspices of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law (“Hague Conference”).1 The
Hague Conference is an inﬂuential inter-governmental organization,
conceived and largely dominated by Continental European academics and
government representatives.2 Over the past 70 years, the Conference has
produced texts of some 40 private international law instruments, addressing

1 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, Jun. 30, 2005, 44 ILM 1294. (hereinafter
Convention). See The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (June, 30 2005) (available at
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/specialised-sections/choice-of-court).
2 The Hague Conference was conceived in the late 19th century and held its ﬁrst conference
in 1893. It was for decades an “exclusively European event.” Jürgen Basedow, The Hague Conference
and the Future of Private International Law: A Jubilee Speech, 82 RABELSZ 924, 935 (2018). In recent
decades, non-European states have participated in the Conference, but European states have
retained their “programmatic inﬂuence” and both the Conference and its Permanent Secretariat
remain predominantly European in focus. Id. at 924. That has been reinforced by the European
Union’s exercise of control over the positions of European states on issues of private international
law, while those states retain individual voting rights in the Conference’s decision-making. Ronald
A. Brand, Community Competence for Matters of Judicial Cooperation at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law: A View from the United States, 21 J. L. & COMM. 191, 208 (2002). For the original
Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, see 15 U.S.T. 2228. Amendments to
the Statute were adopted on June 30, 2005 and approved on September 30, 2006. See generally Kurt
Lipstein, One Hundred Years of Hague Conferences on Private International Law, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.
Q. 553 (1993); Peter Pfund, The Hague Conference Celebrates its 100th Anniversary, 28 TEX. INT’L L.
J. 531 (1993).
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various aspects of the recognition of judgments,3 choice of law,4 jurisdiction5
and related topics.6
Among other things, in 1954, the Hague Conference proposed a
convention on international civil procedure,7 in 1965, a convention on choice
of court agreements8 and, in 1971, a convention (and addendum) on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.9 As with a number of
other proposals by the Conference,10 these various conventions attracted only
minimal state support and none of them came into eﬀect.11 In contrast, several
3 See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Feb. 2, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249; Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 2, 1971,
1144 U.N.T.S. 271; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
or Commercial Matters, July 2, 2019 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137).
4 See Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, June 15, 1955, 510
U.N.T.S. 149; Convention on the Law Governing Transfer of Title in International Sales of Goods,
Apr. 15, 1958 (not in force) (available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/17ba42d1-9aab-4459-8eefc86052d195b9.pdf); Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, Oct. 2, 1973, 1056
U.N.T.S. 187; Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, Oct. 2, 1973, 1056
U.N.T.S. 199; Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes, Mar. 14, 1978,
16 INT’L L. MATERIALS 14; Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency, Mar. 14, 1978, 26 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 434, 438.
5 See Convention on the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the Case of International Sales
of Goods, Apr. 15, 1978 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/full-text/?cid=34); Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of
Decrees Relating to Adoptions, Nov. 15, 1965, 1107 U.N.T.S. 34; Convention on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-Operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility
and Measures for the Protection of Children, Oct. 19, 1996, 35 INT’L L. MATERIALS 1396.
6 See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to
Maintenance Obligations Towards Children, Apr. 15, 1958, 539 U.N.T.S. 27; Convention Concerning
the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of the Protection of Infants, Oct. 5,
1961, 658 U.N.T.S. 143.
7 Convention on Civil Procedure, Mar. 1, 1954, 286 U.N.T.S. 265.
8 Convention on the Choice of Court, Nov. 25, 1965
(not
in
force) (available
at
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98).
9 Supplementary Protocol the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 2, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 271 (concluded
Feb. 1, 1971).
10 Among the least eﬀective proposals of the Hague Conference are “the two conventions that
were drafted to supplement the Conﬂicts Convention on Sales, the Convention of April 15, 1958 on
the Law Governing Transfer of Title in International Sales of Goods . . . and the Convention . . .
on the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the Case of International Sales of Goods. The ﬁrst
named convention has received one ratiﬁcation and the latter, none.” Kurt H. Nadelmann, The
United States Joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law: A “History” with Comments, 30
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 316 (1965).
11 See, e.g., Convention on the Law Governing Transfer of Title in International Sales of Goods,
Apr. 15, 1958 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/fulltext/?cid=32); Convention on the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the Case of International
Sales of Goods, Apr. 15, 1958 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=34); Convention of 1 June 1956 Concerning the Recognition
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of the treaties negotiated under the Hague Conference’s auspices with other
subject matters have proven relatively successful.12
Notwithstanding this history,13 the Hague Conference elected to revisit
the topic of a multilateral recognition of judgments and jurisdiction
convention in 1996 (after four years of discussions and study).14 Thereafter,
the Conference devoted nearly a decade to discussion of a jurisdiction and
judgments convention, which took what was described as a “mixed
Convention approach.”15 The Conference’s proposed mixed treaty would have
relatively comprehensively regulated both permissible and prohibited
grounds of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.16
of the Legal Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations and Institutions, June 1, 1956 (not in
force)
(available
at
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=36);
Convention on the Choice of Court, Nov. 25, 1965 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.
net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98); Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, Dec. 22, 1986 (not in force) (available at
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=61); Convention on the Law
Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, Aug. 1, 1989 (not in force) (available
at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=62); Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 2, 2019
(not yet in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137).
12 See, e.g., Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 659 U.N.T.S. 163 (78 Contracting States); Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (16 ratifications);
Convention on Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation [sic] for Foreign Public Documents, Oct. 5,
1961, 537 U.N.T.S. 189 (120 Contracting States); Convention on Protection of Children and CoOperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 000 (103 Contracting
States). See also Status of Signatures, Ratifications, and Accessions, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L.
(available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/status-charts) (last updated: Sep. 9, 2021).
13 It is often remarked that the Choice of Court Convention was proposed in 1992 by the
United States. See Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, Hague Conference on Private International
Law: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements: Explanatory Report 785 [hereinafter
Report] (citing proposals by Arthur T. von Mehren as “intellectual origins” of Convention); RONALD
A. BRAND & PAUL HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT
AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 6 n.19 (3d ed. 2008) (citing Letter of May 5,
1992 from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Georges Droz,
Secretary General, Hague Conference (May 5, 1992)).
14 Report, at 785. For accounts of the Convention’s history, see Paul Beaumont, Hague Choice of
Court Agreement Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, Analysis and Current Status, 5 J. PRIV.
INT’L L. 125 (2009); BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 7-10; Andrea Schulz, The Hague Convention
of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 2 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 243, 244-48 (2006); Christian Thiele,
The Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements: Was It Worth the Eﬀort?, in ECKART
GOTTSCHALK, RALF MICHAELS, GIESELA RÜHL, & JAN VON HEIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A
GLOBALIZED WORLD 63 (2007); Hans van Loon, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements—An Introduction, 18 ANNALS FAC. L.U. ZENICA 11 (2016).
15 The Secretary General of the Hague Conference appointed a Special Commission which
held ﬁve meetings between 1997 and 1999. Schulz, supra note 14, at 244-45.
16 See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 5, 7 (departing from past conventions by creating
a “hybrid” structure); van Loon, supra note 14, at 13-14 (noting how this is a “grey area” to national
law).
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After (another) ﬁve years of discussions, a draft convention was narrowly
approved by the Hague Conference (with European states constituting the
majority, while a number of non-European states voted against the draft).17
The lack of broad-based support for the Conference’s proposed draft
jurisdiction and judgments convention led to a decision in June 2001 to
suspend work on a mixed convention.18 Instead, in April 2002, the Hague
Conference “modiﬁed the entire project”19 by directing the formation of an
informal Working Group charged with drafting an entirely new convention
limited only to areas of apparent agreement on jurisdictional rules between
state representatives.20 The Group’s eﬀorts were focussed on proceedings
involving jurisdiction based on choice of court agreements in business-tobusiness cases, submission, the defendant’s forum, and counterclaims.21
The Working Group produced a draft in less than a year (in April 2003),22
which was then submitted to a Special Commission that, in another year,
produced a materially revised text (in April 2004).23 The draft was presented
in June 2005 to the Hague Conference’s Diplomatic Conference, which then
produced the Convention’s ﬁnal text. With the signing of the Final Act, on
June 30, 2005, the Convention was “open[ed] for signature and ratiﬁcation.”24
The ﬁrst state to accede to the Choice of Court Convention was Mexico
(in 2007), followed by the European Union (in 2015).25 The Convention has
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 9.
This was suspended because of the wide diﬀerences existing in rules of jurisdiction in
diﬀerent States and the consequences of technological developments (including the Internet and
electronic commerce) for jurisdictional rules. Report, supra note 13, at 785-86.
19 BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 9.
20 The Working Group was chaired by Professor Allan Philip from Denmark and included
participants from the European Commission, Germany Italy, Switzerland Spain, the UK, Argentina,
Brazil, China, Egypt, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, South Africa, and the United
States. Schulz, supra note 14, at 247. The Special Commission was chaired by Professor Philip (and later
Andreas Bucher), with Messrs. Hartley and Dogauchi as Rapporteurs, and included participants from
Japan, Switzerland, US, China, Russia Federation, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.
21 Report, supra note 13, at 787; Schulz, supra note 14, at 247.
22 The informal Working Group met three times in 2002 and 2003, submitting its draft text to
the Hague Conference’s Commission on General Aﬀairs and Policy of the Conference in April 2003.
See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 9 (documenting the expedited timeline).
23 After consultation with Member States in April 2003, it was concluded that there was
suﬃcient support for the draft to form a Special Commission to continue work on the informal work
draft. The Special Commission had two meetings during December 2003 and April 2004. Report,
supra note 13, at 786.
24 BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 10.
25 The EU’s instrument of accession was deposited on June 2015. The Convention entered into
force for members of the EU on 1 October 2015 (except for Denmark, as to which it entered into force
on 1 September 2018). The United Kingdom and Ireland are also bound by the Convention. The
United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020 but acceded to the Convention in its own right on
28 September 2020. Michael James, Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, THOMAS
REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
17
18
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also been ratiﬁed by Singapore (in 2016),26 Montenegro (in 2018) and the
United Kingdom (in 2020).27 The Convention ﬁrst entered into force on
October 1, 2015, and is now in force for the European Union and its 27
Member States (including Denmark, which acceded separately),
Montenegro, the United Kingdom and Singapore.28 The Convention has also
been signed, but not ratiﬁed, by several states, including the United States
(in 2009), Ukraine (in 2016) and China (in 2017).29
The Hague Conference has high aspirations for the Convention, which
has been vigorously promoted by both the Conference’s Permanent Bureau
and the European Union. The New York Convention, with nearly 170
Contracting States, has been repeatedly identiﬁed as both the Choice of
Court Convention’s model and ultimate measure of success. In the words of
the Hague Conference’s Explanatory Report, “[t]he hope is that the
Convention will do for choice of court agreements what the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
of 10 June 1958 has done for arbitration agreements.”30 Or, as the First
Secretary of the Permanent Bureau later put it, with even higher aspirations:
It is hoped that the new Convention will do for choice-of-court agreements
what the highly successful 1958 New York Convention does for arbitration
agreements, namely to protect party autonomy and to provide predictability
and legal certainty to business parties who want to make arrangements for
the resolution of disputes that have arisen or may arise between them.31

In these and other commentary, there has been no hesitation about
recommending the Convention or promoting its ratiﬁcation by states on a
26 Singapore ratifies the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, HCCH https://www.hcch.net/en/newsarchive/details/?varevent=491 (last visited June 10, 2021).
27 Montenegro signs the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, HCCH https://www.hcch.net/en/newsarchive/details/?varevent=575 (last visited June 10, 2021). United Kingdom joins 2005 Choice of Court
and
2007
Child
Support
Conventions,
HCCH
https://www.hcch.net/es/newsarchive/details/?varevent=751 (last visited June 10, 2021). See also Van Loon, supra note 14, at 14, 16.
28 James, supra note 25.
29 Id. at 28.
30 Report, supra note 13, at 791. See also Mark Pring & Ryan Craig, United States: The Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: A New York Style Global Convention for Litigation, MONDAQ
(Feb. 7, 2006) https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/reinsurance/37694/the-hague-convention-onchoice-of-court-agreements-a-new-york-style-global-convention-for-litigation?login=true
(emphasis omitted) (noting that the New York Convention “has provided a much clearer structure
for ensuring easier recognition and enforcement (of arbitration awards)”); Louise Ellen Teitz, The
Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration,
53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 548 (2005) (citing how the Choice of Court Convention is “the litigation
analogue for the New York Convention because it seeks to provide an equal and viable alternative
to arbitration); Thiele, supra note 14, at 66 (“It is this gap that the Hague Convention now strives to
close”).
31 Schulz, supra note 14, at 267–68.
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worldwide basis. On the contrary, the Convention’s proponents variously
describe it as “ﬁlling the governance gap that, in the absence of a uniform
global legal regime, currently exists concerning the eﬀect of choice of court
agreements;”32 marking “a major milestone of international civil procedure;”33
enhancing the “movement of people, goods, capital, services, and ideas” [by
ensuring] the “free movement of judgments;”34 and providing “an opportunity
for creating a worldwide judicial alternative for business-to-business dispute
resolutions.”35 Like the New York Convention, the Choice of Court
Convention has been consistently promoted as a global instrument, suitable
for ratification by all states, which will ensure respect for party autonomy (by
giving effect to forum selection agreements) and efficiency (by permitting
relatively easy recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments).
II. THE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION: STRUCTURE AND
PROVISIONS
The basic structure and purpose of the Choice of Court Convention are
straightforward. The Convention requires that Contracting States give eﬀect
to international choice-of-court agreements, and to enforce the resulting
judgments, subject in each case to only limited exceptions. The stated purpose
of the Convention is to encourage cross-border trade and investment by
enhancing international judicial cooperation through “uniform rules on
jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil
or commercial matters.”36
The Convention implements these objectives through provisions that: (a)
require a Contracting State’s court to hear disputes that are subject to an
exclusive choice-of-court provision designating that court as the forum for
adjudication;37 (b) forbid Contracting States’ courts from hearing disputes
that are subject to an exclusive choice-of-court provision specifying the courts
of another state;38 and (c) require the recognition and enforcement of
judgments by a court speciﬁed in a choice-of-court provision.39 In the words
of the Hague Conference’s Explanatory Report:

Van Loon, supra note 14, at 11.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 269.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 3, 25.
Commission Proposal for a Council decision on the Signing by the European Community of the
Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements, at 2, COM (2008) 538 ﬁnal (Sep. 5, 2008).
36 Convention, preamble.
37 Id., Arts. 1(1), 3 & 5.
38 Id., Art. 6.
39 Id., Art. 8.
32
33
34
35
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If the Convention is to attain its aim of making choice of court agreements
as eﬀective as possible, it has to ensure three things. Firstly, the chosen court
must hear the case when proceedings are brought before it; secondly, any
other court before which proceedings are brought must refuse to hear them;
and thirdly, the judgment of the chosen court must be recognized and
enforced.40

The Convention includes various exceptions to these obligations,
including for cases where a choice-of-court agreement is null and void; where
it would lead to manifest injustice or cannot reasonably be performed;41 and
for cases where a judgment was based upon a null and void choice-of-court
provision, was obtained by procedural fraud, or was manifestly incompatible
with the recognizing State’s public policy.42 The Convention also contains
additional provisions regarding punitive damages,43 preliminary questions,44
and interim relief. 45
A. Scope of Convention
The Convention is limited in scope, applying only to a deﬁned category
of choice-of-court agreements and the judgments resulting from such
agreements. Article 1 of the Convention makes this clear, providing that “this
Convention shall apply in international cases to exclusive choice of court
agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters.”46 Each of these three
limitations are signiﬁcant.47
1. International Cases
The Convention applies only in “international cases,” as deﬁned by the
Convention itself. Article 1 of the Convention deﬁnes “international,” with
separate deﬁnitions, one for purposes of jurisdiction and one for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
First, Article 1(2) adopts an unusual approach to defining “international
cases” for jurisdictional purposes (under Chapter II of the Convention). It
provides that, for jurisdictional purposes, a case is “international” “unless the
Report, supra note 13, at 791.
Convention, Arts. 6(a), 6(c)-(d).
Id., Arts. 9(a), 9(d)-(e).
Id., Art. 11(1).
Id., Art. 10.
Id., Art. 7 (noting how “interim measures of protection are not governed by this
Convention.”).
46 Id., Art. 1(1).
47 See Thiele, supra note 14, at 67, 71 (“the Convention’s scope is limited by a vast number of
mandatory exclusions and the opportunity for each member state to allow other exclusions.”).
40
41
42
43
44
45
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parties are resident in the same Contracting State and the relationship of the
parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the location
of the chosen court, are connected only with that State.”48 Thus, unless all
“elements” of a case are connected only with a single State, the case is
international, and the fact that the parties have selected a foreign court as the
forum will not make a case international.49 Phrased positively, any case with
elements that are connected to more than a single state will be international,
except where the sole foreign element is the choice of a foreign forum.
Second, Article 1(3) deﬁnes “international” cases for purposes of the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments diﬀerently. Article 1(3)
provides that “a case is international where recognition or enforcement of a
foreign judgment is sought.”50 Under Article 1(3), the fact that a judgment is
rendered by a foreign court makes the case “international,” with the result
that a case that was domestic (non-international) for jurisdictional purposes
can become international after a judgment is rendered and recognition is
sought in another State.51 In contrast to the treatment of Article 1(2), the sole
fact that a judgment was rendered by a foreign court makes the case
international for purposes of Article 1(3).
The Convention also permits Contracting States to make declarations
that can aﬀect the deﬁnitions of “international” cases. Article 19 permits a
Contracting State to “declare that its courts may refuse to determine disputes
to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies if, except for the
location of the chosen court, there is no connection between the State and
the parties or the dispute.”52 A declaration made under Article 19 allows a
court of a Contracting State not to comply with the otherwise applicable
requirement, under Article 5, to hear disputes that are subject to an exclusive
choice-of-court agreement selecting that court as the parties’ chosen forum.
The rationale underlying this provision is that it allows Contracting States to
choose not to bear the cost of dispute resolution for parties with no
connection to the forum, while permitting other States to encourage
international commercial disputes to be litigated in their courts (by not

48 Id., Art. 1(2). This produces the odd result that a case can be international if between two
nationals of the same non-Contracting State, with all relevant elements of the case connected to
that state, although it would not be international in the case of two nationals of a Contracting State.
See Francesca Ragno, The Brussels I Recast Regulation and the Hague Convention on Choice-of-Courts
Agreements: Convergences or Divergences?, in CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION IN EUROPE: THE
BRUSSELS I RECAST REGULATION AS A PANACEA? 95 (Franco Ferrari & Francesca Ragno, eds.,
2015).
49 Id., Art. 1(2). BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 16.
50 Convention, Art. 1(3).
51 Report, supra note 13, at 792.
52 Convention, Art. 19.
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exercising their rights to make an Article 19 declaration).53 The Convention
also permits a Contracting State to make a declaration that:
Its courts may refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment given by a court of
another Contracting State if the parties were resident in the requested State
and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the
dispute, other than the location of the chosen court, were connected only with
the requested State.54

This provision, in Article 20, complements Article 1(3), providing that, if
the only foreign element in a case is the location of the chosen court, but all
the other elements are connected to the requested State, that State may refuse
recognition on the theory that the case is domestic to its legal system.55
2. Exclusive Choice-of-Court Agreements
The Convention is applicable to “exclusive choice of court agreements,”
which are deﬁned in Article 3(a).56 Article 3(a) limits the scope of the
Convention to those forum selection agreements that designate “for the
purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection
with a particular legal relationship” the courts of a Contracting State.57 Article
3(a) does not include choice-of-court provisions selecting the courts of
countries that are not Contracting States.
Article 3 also prescribes three other rules regarding exclusive choice-of-court
agreements: a deeming rule, an evidentiary or formal validity rule and a
severability rule. The deeming rule adopts the treatment of forum selection
provisions that prevails under European Union law,58 and provides that a choiceof-court agreement is deemed to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts other than
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 16.
Convention, Art. 20.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 16.
Article 3(a) provides: “‘exclusive choice of court agreement’ means an agreement concluded
by two or more parties that meets the requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the purpose
of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship,
the courts of one Contracting State or one or more speciﬁc courts of one Contracting State to the
exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.”
57 Convention, Art. 3 (including agreements that select (a) in general terms the courts of one
Contracting State (e.g., English courts), or (b) one or more speciﬁc courts of a particular Contracting
State (e.g., Southern District of New York)).
58 See Ashlee Schaller, Interpretation of Forum Selection Clauses: A Survey of Select English- and
German-Speaking Jurisdictions, 44 N.C. J. Int’l L. 124 (2018) (noting that EU law governing private
international law issues regarding jurisdiction clauses is primarily regulated by the “re-cast” Brussels
I Regulation. The Regulation also contains a deeming rule regarding forum selection agreements,
with Article 25(1) providing that jurisdiction under a choice-of-court clause “shall be exclusive unless
the parties have agreed otherwise.” Id. at 125; see Ragno, supra note 49, at 225 (comparing the
Convention and the EU regime).
53
54
55
56
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the chosen court unless the parties agree otherwise. Thus, Article 3(b) provides
that “a choice of court agreement which designates the courts of one Contracting
State . . . shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly
provided otherwise.”59 Commentary on the Convention observes that Article
3(b) “is an important provision. It reverses the presumption found in the
majority of U.S. courts that a choice of court agreement is ‘permissive’ (nonexclusive) unless otherwise expressly indicated.”60 Or, in the words of another
commentator, “Article 3(b) contains an important rule that will change the legal
situation in particular in the USA and other common law jurisdictions, and will
greatly expand the scope of the Convention.”61
Article 3(c) also prescribes an evidentiary rule that imposes formal
requirements that a choice-of-court agreement must satisfy in order to be
considered valid. Those requirements are that the agreement must be
“concluded or documented” either “in writing” or “by any other means of
communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for
subsequent reference.”62 Article 3(c) is a mandatory rule, which neither
contracting parties nor Contracting States may modify (for example, if a
Contracting State wished to recognize choice-of-court agreements satisfying
a less demanding form requirement).63 On the other hand, the form
requirement imposed by Article 3 is relatively lenient, giving eﬀect to choiceof-court agreements even if concluded orally or by conduct, provided only
that they are also documented in written form.
Article 3(d) provides for a severability rule: a choice-of-court agreement
shall be “treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the
contract.”64 This provision, which is relatively non-controversial, limits the
circumstances in which the existence, validity, or legality of a forum selection
agreement may be challenged (by requiring that such challenges be directed
to the choice-of-court provision itself, and not only to the underlying
commercial contract within which that provision is found).65

Convention, Art. 3(b).
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 17; see Report, 785.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 253.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 17(emphasizing that the requirements of Article 3(b)
are consistent with other recent international private law conventions such as 2005 UNCITRAL
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in Internal Contracts).
63 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 756 (3d ed. 2021) (noting that
in this respect, the Convention is materially more limited than the New York Convention, which
imposes a maximum, but not a minimum, form requirement, leaving Contracting States free to
adopt more lenient forum requirements for international arbitration agreements).
64 Convention, Art. 3(4).
65 Report, supra note 13, at 813; see BORN, supra note 63, at 375-506 (noting that the separability
provision is derived from the treatment of international arbitration agreements under the New York
Convention and most national arbitration statutes).
59
60
61
62
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3. Civil or Commercial Matters
The Convention is limited to choice-of-court agreements and judgments
in “civil” or “commercial” matters.66 Neither Article 1 nor other provisions of
the Convention deﬁne either of these terms, although the Explanatory
Report opines that “civil or commercial matters has an autonomous meaning:
it does not entail a reference to national law or other instruments” and it is
“primarily intended to exclude public law and criminal law.”67 There is a
substantial body of authority (including national courts, commentary, and
other materials) which consider the meaning of the terms “civil” and
“commercial” in other private international law contexts, and which would be
instructive in matters arising under the Convention.68
4. Exclusions from Scope of Convention
The Convention also includes a number of subject matter exclusions from
its scope.69 First, Article 2(1) provides that the Convention will not apply to
choice-of-court agreements in which a “consumer is a party” or to choice-ofcourt agreements “relating to contracts of employment.”70 This generally
parallels the treatment of forum selection provisions under European Union
and Member State legislation,71 and results in the Convention applying
primarily to choice-of-court provisions in commercial contracts between
merchants.72 The Convention departs in this respect from the treatment of

66 Report, supra note 13, at 801 (explaining that the reason for including both terms (civil and
commercial) is because in some countries civil and commercial matters are regarded as separate and
mutually exclusive categories).
67 Id. at 801.
68 See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 74 (noting that Article 2(5) sheds some light on
these terms, providing that a case remains within the scope of the Convention when it involves a
State, including a government agency or any person acting for a State. In this sense, if the State is
acting in its private capacity (“ius gestioni”), “the beneﬁts and burdens of the Convention should be
shared evenly”).
69 Convention, Art. 2(3) (permitting subject matters that are excluded from the Convention’s
scope nonetheless to be heard by a chosen court if they arise “merely as a preliminary question and
not as an object of the proceedings); see Convention, Art. 10 (providing that Article 2(3)has
particular application to intellectual property rights disputes, where questions on validity and
infringement, excluded by Article 2(2), might arise as incidental to a primary contract claim); see
also id. (emphasizing the counterpart to Article 2(3)’s exception: under Article 10, a court is not
required under the Convention to recognize the resulting judgment of the case in which the
preliminary matter was heard).
70 Arts. 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b).
71 See Brussels I Regulation, Commission Regulation 1215/2012 of Dec. 12, 2012, On Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J (L 351) 812 (outlining special protections for insureds, consumers, and employees in sections 3–5 of Chapter 2).
72 Schulz, supra note 14, at 248.
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consumer and employment contracts in the United States and a number of
other developed jurisdictions.73
The Convention also excludes a number of speciﬁc subject matters from
its scope. Article 2(2) excludes matters that are assertedly so closely
connected to a State, or its interests, that mandatory exclusive jurisdiction is
justiﬁed.74 This (fairly detailed and lengthy) list includes disputes related to
personal status,75 legal capacity of natural persons,76 maintenance obligations
and other family law matters,77 wills and successions,78 insolvency
proceedings,79 in rem rights in immovable property,80 internal corporate
matters,81 validity of intellectual property rights82 (with the exception of
copyright and related matters) and infringement of intellectual property
rights.83 This list parallels European Union instruments and departs from
that of the New York Convention and many other private international law
regimes (which are both less restrictive and do not mandatorily exclude
particular subjects, instead leaving it to Contracting States to deﬁne matters
that are excluded).84
The Convention also includes another list of exclusions in Article 2(2) for
matters that “raise particular concerns in cross-border commerce, often
because they are subject to other well-functioning legal regimes or because
they will involve disputes ancillary to the main thrust of the Convention.”85
This list is also lengthy and includes the carriage of passengers and goods,86

Van Loon, supra note 14, at 11.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 18.
Convention, Art. 2(2)(a).
Id.
Id., Art. 2(2)(c).
Id., Art. 2(2)(d).
Id., Art. 2(2)(e).
Id., Art. 2(2)(l).
Id., Art. 2(2)(m).
Id., Art. 2(2)(n); see also Report, supra note 13, at 805 (“Proceedings that concern the validity
of an intellectual property right other than copyright or related rights are excluded from the
Convention . . . . However, Article 2(3) makes clear that proceedings on a matter covered by the
Convention are not excluded just because the validity of an intellectual property right arises as a
preliminary question.”)
83 Report, supra note 13, at 806, discussing how under Article 2(2)(o):
[i]nfringement proceedings (for intellectual property rights other than copyright and related
rights) are excluded except where they are brought for breach of a contract between the parties
relating to such rights, or could have been brought for breach of that contract . . . . Secondly, the
proceedings must either be for breach of that contract or they must be proceedings which, even if
brought in tort, could have been brought for breach of the contract.
84 BORN, supra note 63, at 1028-31.
85 BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 18.
86 Convention, Art. 2(2)(f).
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
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certain maritime matters,87 “anti-trust (competition) matters,”88 claims for
personal injury to natural persons,89 liability for nuclear damages,90 validity
of entries in public registers91 and non-contractual tort claims for damage to
tangible property.92 Article 2(2) excludes from the Convention’s scope a
number of matters (e.g., antitrust, tort claims) that are within the scope of both
the New York Convention and most international arbitration agreements.93
Finally, Article 21(1) of the Convention also provides that a Contracting
State that has a “strong interest in not applying this Convention to a speciﬁc
matter, may declare that it will not apply the Convention to that matter”; it
also provides that, in doing so, the State must “ensure that the declaration is
no broader than necessary and that the matter excluded is clearly and
precisely deﬁned.”94 The Convention includes additional safeguards,
regulating a State’s ability to exclude additional matters from the Convention,
by requiring transparency95 and non-retroactivity:96 Contracting States must
deposit declarations under Article 21 in advance and cannot apply them
retroactively to choice-of-court agreements concluded prior to the eﬀective
date of the declaration.97
B. Jurisdictional Rules under Convention
Chapter 2 of the Convention sets out what the Convention terms
jurisdictional rules, which address the validity and enforceability of
international choice-of-court agreements that are subject to the Convention.
Id., Art. 2(2)(g).
Id., Art. 2(2)(h).
Id., Art. 2(2)(j).
Id., Art. 2(2)(i).
Id., Art. 2(2)(p).
Id., Art. 2(2)(k). Article 2(4) also provides that the Convention “shall not apply to
arbitration and related proceedings.” Id., Art. 2(4).
93 See BORN, supra note 63, at 1036 (discussing how, among other things, antitrust or
competition law claims, securities law claims, corruption defenses, fraud claims, insolvency disputes
and a wide range of other matters are generally treated as arbitrable).
94 Convention, Art. 21(1). But see Ragno, supra note 48, at 133 (criticizing the Article 21(1)
mechanism).
95 See Convention, Art. 32 (describing how any declaration made under Article 21 must be
notiﬁed to the depositary, which will inform the other States in order to ensure transparency and
prevent the retroactive application of national law).
96 See Report, supra note 13, at 843 (“If the declaration is made after the Convention comes into
force for the State making it, it will not take effect for at least three months. Since it will not apply
retroactively (Art. 32(3)) to contracts concluded before it takes effect, it will be possible for the parties
to know, when they conclude a contract, whether it will be affected. This protects legal security.”).
97 The Convention also provides that Article 21 is subject to a reciprocity requirement.
Convention, Art. 21. When a State makes an Article 21 declaration, “other States will not be required
to apply the Convention regarding the matter in question when the chosen court is in the State
making the declaration.” Report, supra note 13, at 843.
87
88
89
90
91
92
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Chapter 2 contains two basic sets of rules, providing for: (1) the exclusive and
mandatory jurisdiction of a court chosen by a valid exclusive choice-of-court
agreement; and (2) the lack of jurisdiction of other courts, not chosen by a
valid exclusive choice-of-court agreement.98
1. Exclusive and Mandatory Jurisdiction of Chosen Court
The Convention provides that the court of a Contracting State that is
designated by a valid exclusive choice-of-court agreement possesses exclusive
jurisdiction, which it is mandatorily required to exercise (subject to minor
exceptions discussed below). Thus, Article 5(1) provides that a chosen court
“shall have” jurisdiction to decide disputes governed by a choice-of-court
provision unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State:
The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice
of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the
agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of
that State.99

Article 5(1) includes both a positive grant of jurisdiction, coterminous
with a valid choice-of-court agreement and a choice-of-law provision,
selecting the law of the chosen State to govern the validity of the choice-ofcourt agreement. The Convention’s Explanatory Report opines, in a
departure from general private international law principles,100 that the law of

98 See Convention, Ch. II.
99 Convention, Art. 5(1).
100 In most private international

law contexts involving the choice of applicable law,
speciﬁcation of a jurisdiction’s law refers to its substantive law, not including its choice-of-law rules.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §186 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1971) (“The
reference, in the absence of a contrary indication of intention . . . , is to the ‘local law’ of the state
of the applicable law and not to that state’s ‘law’ which means the totality of its law including its
choice-of-law rules . . . .”); John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92
Wash. L. Rev. 631, 642-47 (2017) (describing the canon in favor of internal law in conﬂicts of law);
Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht § 10 (9th ed. 2004). The purpose of this
rule is to provide predictability and avoid the expense and uncertainty of renvoi.
Oddly, the Explanatory Report asserts that, if no renvoi had been contemplated, the Convention
would have referred to the “internal” law of the chosen state. See also Paul Beaumont & Burcu Yüksel,
The Validity of Choice of Court Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation and the Hague Choice of Court
Agreements Convention, in K. Boele-Woelki et al., eds., Convergence and Divergence in Private
International Law. Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr 563, 575 (2010). That reasoning would apply to all
choice-of-law agreements and statutory choice-of-law rules, which virtually always refer simply to
the “law” of a speciﬁed jurisdiction and which are uniformly interpreted as referring only to the
internal or substantive law of that state. See also Ragno, supra note 48, at 137-38; Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice-of-Court Agreements: American Practice in A Comparative Perspective, in US
Litigation Today: Still A Threat for European Businesses or Just A Paper Tiger? 85 (Andrea Bonomi &
Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, eds., 2018).
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the chosen State referred to in Article 5(1) includes its conﬂict of laws rules,101
apparently, if anomalously, contemplating a form of renvoi.
The Convention does not deﬁne the phrase “null and void,” which was
borrowed from the New York Convention. The Explanatory Report opines
that Article 5(1)’s “null and void” exception applies only to substantive, not
formal, grounds of invalidity the provision:
is intended to refer primarily to generally recognised grounds like fraud,
mistake, misrepresentation, duress and lack of capacity. It does not qualify,
or detract from, the form requirements in Article 3 c), which deﬁne the choice
of court agreements covered by the Convention and leave no room for
national law as far as form is concerned.102

The Convention does not expressly address the issue, but the “null and
void” formula presumably also extends to issues of formation and consent (as
indicated by both the general inclusion in other contexts of such issues as
grounds for concluding that an agreement is “null and void” and by the
Explanatory Report’s speciﬁc inclusion of duress and capacity within the
category).103 The Convention also does not specify the law to be applied to
determine the existence of a choice-of-law agreement, although Article 5(1)’s
general choice-of-law provision would again appear applicable.104
The Convention also prohibits the chosen court under a valid exclusive
choice-of-court agreement from declining jurisdiction. Article 5(2) provides:
“A court that has jurisdiction under paragraph 1 shall not decline to exercise
Report, supra note 13, at 815.
Id.
The Explanatory Report also comments, less than clearly, that “the Convention as a whole
comes into operation only if there is a choice of court agreement, and this assumes that the basic
factual requirements of consent exist. If, by any normal standards, these do not exist, a court would
be entitled to assume that the Convention is not applicable, without having to consider foreign law.”
Id. at 809. That arguably implies that issues concerning “basic factual requirements of consent” are
not subject to the law of the chosen court or to the Convention’s null and void standard. See id.; see
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 29, 79 (emphasizing formation and existence not governed by
Convention); see also Jason Webb Yackee, A Matter of Good Form: The (Downsized) Hague Judgements
Convention and Conditions of Formal Validity for the Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements, 53 DUKE
L J. 1179, 1193-94 (2004) (highlighting federal courts’ use of forum selection agreements); see also
Peter Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts 83 (1998). That conclusion, which requires drawing
diﬃcult distinctions between (some kinds of) consent and other defects in formation and validity,
appears unlikely. See Beaumont, supra note 14, at 139-40 (distinguishing the Hartley and Dogauchi
approach from the Brand and Herrup approach of choice-of-law rules); see also Ragno, supra note
48, at 130.
104 Some commentators have suggested the contrary. BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 79
(quoting “[p]resumably, the law of the forum—including its choice of law rules—will apply . . . .”).
That conclusion is diﬃcult to reconcile with either the breadth of Article 5(1)’s “null and void”
formula or the diﬃculties in distinguishing between issues of formation (or existence) and validity
in an international context. See Beaumont, supra note 14, at 139-40 (emphasizing the international
context of choice-of-law rules).
101
102
103
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jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of
another State.”105 This rule adopts the approach of European Union private
international law instruments and was intended to prohibit application of
either of two doctrines: lis pendens and forum non conveniens.106 (As
discussed above, a Contracting State can declare that its court will not
exercise jurisdiction when the only element or connection between the
parties, the dispute, and the State, is the chosen court, permitting a limited
form of refusals to exercise jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds.107)
The possibility of transfer and removal within a state or court system is
addressed in Article 5(3)(b), which provides that the Convention will not
aﬀect rules regulating the internal allocation of jurisdiction among courts
within a Contracting State.108 This permits a judgment issued by another
court than the chosen court, where that court exercised jurisdiction by
operation of the mechanism referred to in Article 5(3)(b), to be recognized
under the Convention. This obligation is subject to a further exception in
cases where the Article 5(3)(b) transfer mechanism involved the exercise of
discretion, in which case recognition of a resulting judgment may be refused
under the Convention as against a party that objected to the transfer.109
2. No Jurisdiction of Courts Not Chosen
The Convention also provides that a court in a Contracting State other
than the court chosen in a valid choice-of-court agreement shall suspend or
dismiss cases to which the agreement applies.110 Article 6 provides: “A court
of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend or
dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies,”
subject to speciﬁed exceptions.111
Article 6’s ﬁrst, and most important, exception provides that a court is not
obligated to dismiss or suspend the case if the agreement is null or void under
the law of the State of the chosen court (paralleling Article 5(1) of the Choiceof-Court Convention and prescribing the same choice-of-law rule). The
Convention, Art. 5(2).
See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 82 (deﬁning lis pendens and forum non
conveniens); see also Report supra note 13, at 791 (emphasizing that refusal to hear a case is prohibited
on the grounds of lis pendens or forum non conveniens).
107 Convention, Art. 19.
108 See Convention, Art. 5(3)(b) (quoting “[t]he preceding paragraphs shall not aﬀect rules . . .
(b) on the internal allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a Contracting State. However,
where the chosen court has discretion as to whether to transfer a case, due consideration should be
given to the choice of the parties.”).
109 BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 87.
110 Report, supra note 13, at 791.
111 Convention, Art. 6 (listing the exceptions which permit the seized court to exercise
jurisdiction).
105
106
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Explanatory Report elaborates, saying that “[b]y specifying the applicable
law, Article 6(a) of the Convention helps to ensure that the court seised and
the chosen court give consistent judgments on the validity of the choice of
court agreement.”112
Article 6 also sets forth four other exceptions related to the “null and void”
formula in Article 6(a). Article 6(b) provides that a court need not give eﬀect
to a choice-of-court provision where a party lacked capacity under the law of
the court seised, including its choice-of-law rules.113 Additionally, Article 6(c)
provides that a seised court may exercise jurisdiction after determining that
giving eﬀect to the agreement will lead to a manifest injustice or would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised.114
Relatedly, Article 6(d) provides that a choice-of-court agreement need not
be given eﬀect by a seised court where, “for exceptional reasons beyond the
control of the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed.”115 This
exception includes no choice-of-law rule, and, although the text is arguably
broader, commentary suggests that it will be applicable when “the chosen
court has decided not to hear the case.”116 It appears that this exception was
designed to ensure that the Convention will not result in cases where the
court chosen in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement refuses to hear a case,
but courts of other Contracting States are nonetheless barred by the
Convention from hearing it.117
C. Recognition and Enforcement Rules
Chapter 3 of the Convention addresses the recognition and enforcement
in a Contracting State of judgments rendered by a chosen court in another
Contracting State. The Convention’s general rule is that a judgment rendered
by a court designated in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement shall be
recognized and enforced in all other Contracting States, subject only to
limited and deﬁned exceptions.118 Thus, paralleling Articles III and V of the
New York Convention, Article 8 of the Choice of Court Convention provides:

Report, supra note 13, at 821.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 90.
Report, supra note 13, at 791; see BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 92 (citing the references
to “manifest” injustice or public policy violations, commentary concludes that a choice-of-court
agreement may be denied eﬀect under Article 6(c) only if “[t]he result [is] incontrovertibly unjust
from the perspective of the law and policy of the state of the court seised.”).
115 Convention, Art. 6(d).
116 See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 95 (noting that the exception encompasses cases
of impossibility and (more controversially) fundamentally changed circumstances).
117 BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 95.
118 Convention Art. 8(1).
112
113
114
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(1) A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an
exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced in other
Contracting States in accordance with this Chapter. Recognition or
enforcement may be refused only on the grounds speciﬁed in this
Convention.
(2) Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the application
of the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the merits of the
judgment given by the court of origin. The court addressed shall be bound
by the ﬁndings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction,
unless the judgment was given by default . . . 119

Article 8 also provides that a judgment shall be recognized only if it has
eﬀects in the State where it was rendered and shall be enforced only if it is
enforceable in the State of origin.120
Article 8(5) addresses circumstances in which a chosen court in a
Contracting State has transferred a case to another court in that State,
providing that the Convention’s obligation to recognize and enforce
judgments applies in such circumstances. In addition, however, Article 8(5)
also provides that, where a transfer entailed the exercise of discretion by the
chosen court, recognition and enforcement may be refused against a party
that objected to the transfer.121
Article 9 of the Convention prescribes an exclusive list of seven exceptions
to the obligation in Article 8 to recognize judgments by the chosen court
pursuant to a choice-of-court agreement. Where one of these exceptions
applies, the Convention does not require recognition and enforcement of the
judgment (but also does not preclude such recognition if the requested court
chooses to do so under local law).122 Conversely, unless one of Article 9’s
exceptions apply, a judgment based upon an exclusive international choiceof-court agreement must be recognized and enforced.
Article 9(a) provides that recognition may be denied where a choice-ofcourt agreement is null and void, complementing the similar jurisdictional
119 Id. Article 8(2) also provides, as under the New York Convention, that the requested court
cannot review the merits of the judgment. The grounds of non-recognition (established on Article
V of the New York Convention) do not include an error of law or fact by the arbitral tribunal and
do not permit review of the merits of the arbitral tribunal’s decision. See BORN, supra note 63, at
3760. The rule makes clear that a recognition court may not review foreign judgments in an appellate
capacity. Report, supra note 13, at 825; see Schulz, supra note 14, at 256 (highlighting Article 8).
120 Convention, Art. 8(3). The Convention grants discretion to the requested court to
determine whether to proceed with recognition and enforcement or to postpone recognition and
enforcement until a decision by the court of origin. If the requested court enforced the judgment
and the court of origin later set it aside, the requested court could rescind enforcement. Report, supra
note 13, at 825.
121 Schulz, supra note 14, at 25-57.
122 Report, supra note 13, at 829.

2021]

The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements

2099

rule for chosen courts in article 5(1) and paralleling Article V(1)(a) of the New
York Convention. Importantly, however, Article 9(a) also provides that, if the
chosen court has determined that a choice-of-court agreement is valid under
its law, the requested court must accept this decision: a judgment may be
denied recognition if “the [choice-of-court] agreement was null and void
under the law of the State of the chosen court, unless the chosen court has
determined that the agreement is valid.”123 This qualiﬁcation replicates the
approach of EU law to the recognition of Member State judgments,
assertedly in order to avoid conﬂicting rulings on the validity of the choiceof-court agreement under the law of the chosen court.124
Article 9 also permits non-recognition of a judgment where the judgmentdebtor was not properly notiﬁed of proceedings in the chosen court. First,
Article 9(c) permits non-recognition if the document that instituted
proceedings was not notiﬁed to the judgment-debtor in suﬃcient time and in
a manner to permit a defense.125 The exception does not apply if the
judgment-debtor entered an appearance and presented its defense without
objecting to inadequate notice.126 Second, Article 9(c) also provides that a
judgment may be denied recognition where the document instituting
proceedings in the chosen court “was notiﬁed to the defendant in the
requested State in a manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles
of the requested State concerning service of documents.”127 This limb of
Article 9(c) has no parallel in either the New York Convention or other
international arbitration treaties and is said to be designed to accommodate
concerns of some Contracting States regarding local judicial sovereignty.128
Article 9(d) permits non-recognition of a judgment where “the judgment
was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure.”129 According
123 See Convention, Art. 9(a) (extending to determinations by the chosen court that a choiceof-court agreement exists, including issues of formation; those issues are subsumed within the
concept of a “valid” choice-of-court agreement, referred to in Article 9(a)).
124 See Convention, Art. 9(b) (permitting non-recognition of a judgment where “a party lacked
the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the requested State”); see also Schulz, supra
note 14, at 257 (concluding that issues of capacity are subject to dual scrutiny: under the law of the
chosen court (which may make the agreement invalid under Article 9(a)) and under the law of the
court seised or of the court addressed for recognition and enforcement under Article 9(b)).
125 Convention, Art. 9(c)(i).
126 See Report, supra note 13, at 767 (noting that Article 9(c) is potentially applicable “unless the
defendant entered an appearance and presented his case without contesting notiﬁcation in the court
of origin . . .”).
127 Convention, Art. 9(c)(ii).
128 Thus, the court addressed may refuse to recognize or enforce the judgment “if the writ was
notiﬁed to the defendant in the requested State in a manner that was incompatible with fundamental
principles of that State concerning service of documents.” See Report, supra note 13, at 829. This
permits the requested state to apply its local conceptions of state sovereignty, and its interpretation
of instruments like the Hague Service Convention, to deny recognition of a judgment.
129 Convention, Art. 9(d).
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to the Explanatory Report, fraud for purposes of Article 9(d) is “deliberate
dishonesty or deliberate wrongdoing,”130 apparently excluding cases of
reckless, negligent, or similar misconduct.
Finally, Article 9(e) also allows a requested court to deny recognition of a
judgment if “recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible
with the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the
speciﬁc proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State.”131 Like the New
York Convention,132 however, Article 9(e) includes a choice-of-law provision,
specifying the law (or public policy) of the recognition forum. Unlike the
New York Convention, Article 9(e) only includes violations of procedural
fairness (or due process) within the concept of public policy, rather than as
independent grounds for non-recognition.133
D. Other Matters
The Choice of Court Convention also contains a variety of provisions on
other matters, largely incidental to the Convention’s primary objectives.
First, Article 10 addresses proceedings where a matter excluded from the
scope of the Convention under Article 2(2) or 21 was addressed as a
preliminary issue. In those circumstances, as noted above, the ruling on that
preliminary question itself need not be recognized or enforced under the
Convention.134 Additionally, under Article 10, where a ﬁnal judgment is based
on such a preliminary ruling, then that judgment also may be denied

130 The Explanatory Report cites examples of situations where fraud in connection with
procedural matters can take place: “[e]xamples would be where the plaintiﬀ deliberately serves the
writ, or causes it to be served, on the wrong address; where the plaintiﬀ deliberately gives the
defendant wrong information as to the time and place of the hearing; or where either party seeks to
corrupt a judge, juror or witness, or deliberately conceals key evidence.” See Report, supra note 13, at
831.
131 Convention, Art. 9(e).
132 New York Convention, Art. V(2)(b) (“[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country.”). See BORN, supra note 63, at 4000-01.
133 Finally, Article 9 contains two exceptions, providing that a judgment may be denied
recognition in some circumstances where a conﬂicting judgment exists. If a judgment has been
rendered in the requested state between the same parties as those in the foreign judgment, then the
requested state’s judgment prevails, regardless of whether it was rendered ﬁrst and irrespective of
whether the cause of action in the two proceedings was the same. Convention, Art. 9(f). In contrast,
if the conﬂicting judgment was rendered by a foreign court, the judgment rendered under the choiceof-court agreement may be refused only if several additional requirements are met. Convention,
Art. 9(g); Report, supra note 13, at 833.
134 Schulz, supra note 14, at 269.
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recognition if, and to the extent that, the judgment was based on a matter
excluded under Article 2(2).135
An additional ground for denial of recognition is provided by Article 11,
which applies where a judgment awards non-compensatory damages. In these
circumstances, recognition of the non-compensatory damage award may be
refused, and, if local law in the requested state so provides, compensatory
elements of the judgment also may be denied recognition if they cannot be
detached from the non-compensatory award. States are free to recognize
judgments that include non-compensatory awards, including either the entire
award or only the compensatory portion of the award (but need not do so if
local law does not permit).136
III. THE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION: AN ASSESSMENT
The Choice of Court Convention aspires to be one of the most signiﬁcant
private international law treaties of this century. As noted earlier, its
proponents predict that the Convention will “soon become a major milestone
of international civil procedure”;137 relatedly, the Convention is said to make
“transnational litigation more predictable and consistent.”138 The
Convention’s advocates also assert that its adoption will “remov[e] obstacles
to productive commercial relations, which are best served by party
autonomy,” assertedly safeguarded by the Convention,139 and that the
Convention may “supplant the [New York Convention] as the norm for
resolving international commercial disputes.”140 More expansively, the
Convention is said to “ﬁll[] the governance gap that, in the absence of a
uniform global legal regime, currently exists concerning the eﬀect of choice
of court agreements and the recognition and enforcement of judgments based
on such agreements.”141
135 The Article 10 exception applies only where the court addressed would decide the
preliminary question in a diﬀerent way. Schulz, supra note 14, at 261.
136 Schulz, supra note 14, at 257–58 (“Those States that already now recognise and enforce
foreign damage awards, including punitive damages, to the full extent, may continue to do so. States
that currently ‘shave oﬀ ’ the punitive part (eg, under the public policy exception) and enforce the
compensatory part may continue to do so. And those States that currently refuse recognition and
enforcement of the judgment as a whole because the punitive part is incompatible with their legal
system and they lack a rule to divide the judgment will in the future be obliged under the Convention
to enforce the compensatory part but will be entitled (but not obliged) to enforce the noncompensatory part.”).
137 Schulz, supra note 14, at 269.
138 BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 5.
139 Van Loon, supra note 14, at 12.
140 Jeﬀrey Talpis & Nick Krnjevic, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of June
30, 2005: The Elephant That Gave Birth to A Mouse, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 35 (2006).
141 Van Loon, supra note 14, at 11.
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As discussed in detail above, the Convention seeks to accomplish these
aspirations by substantially altering the existing private international law
rules in many countries that govern the recognition and enforcement of both
international choice-of-court agreements and judgments obtained in
proceedings based on such agreements. In particular, the Choice of Court
Convention’s proponents describe it as replicating, while putatively
improving on, the terms of the New York Convention. Thus, “the new
Convention will do for choice-of-court agreements what the highly successful
1958 New York Convention does for arbitration agreements,”142 and will
“create[ ] a level playing ﬁeld with international commercial arbitration.”143
In particular, the Convention is seen as “protect[ing] party autonomy” and
“provid[ing] predictability and legal certainty to business parties.”144
Despite the Convention’s global aspirations and potential importance, and
the signiﬁcance of the changes that it would produce for private international
law rules in both the United States and other jurisdictions, there has been
virtually no critical assessment of the Convention’s basic terms and likely
effects. Scholarly commentary and official reports are thorough, but for the
most part entirely descriptive or interpretive,145 and, in many cases, primarily
laudatory or promotional.146 There have been no sustained efforts to assess the
costs and benefits of the Convention or the wisdom of its structure and terms.147
The Convention’s basic objectives of facilitating the autonomy of
commercial parties in international forum selection and enhancing the
eﬃciency of dispute resolution in cross-border commercial matters are
worthy. Existing mechanisms for resolving international commercial disputes
in national courts have numerous shortcomings and improvements in the ﬁeld
of international civil litigation are long overdue. Nonetheless, despite its
drafters’ good intentions and high aspirations, there are substantial grounds
for doubting the wisdom of the Convention, both for the United States and
other jurisdictions. That is true for two related sets of reasons.
First, as discussed below, the Convention is almost universally described
as seeking to transplant basic principles from the New York Convention and
its legal regime for international commercial arbitration to the context of
Schulz, supra note 14, at 267.
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 11.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 267.
Report, supra note 13, at 799-861 (providing article-by-article commentary describing and
interpreting the Convention); BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 11-24; 139-72.
146 Van Loon, supra note 14, at 14-28; Schulz supra note 14, at 248-69 (providing a promotional
description of the Convention).
147 For exceptions, see Richard Garnett, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus
or Much Ado about Nothing, 5 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 161 (2009) (considering likely future role of
Convention); Francesca Ragno, Forum Selection under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements—A European Perspective (2018) (considering interplay of Convention and EU regime).
142
143
144
145
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cross-border choice-of-court agreements and national court judgments. The
Convention would, if ratiﬁed, replace existing private international law rules,
in the United States and elsewhere, governing the recognition and
enforcement of forum selection provisions and foreign judgments, with new
rules assertedly modelled on the New York Convention. This objective is
pursued by the Convention notwithstanding very substantial diﬀerences
between the arbitral process, on the one hand, and proceedings in (many)
national courts, on the other hand. These diﬀerences raise serious doubts as
to the beneﬁts of the Choice of Court Convention’s basic terms and objective.
Second, and relatedly, the Choice of Court Convention omits significant
safeguards that the New York Convention and national arbitration legislation
incorporate for the recognition of international arbitration agreements and
arbitral awards. These safeguards ensure that both the parties’ autonomy and
basic tenets of procedural fairness are respected in the arbitral process and the
recognition of arbitration agreements and awards. By omitting these safeguards,
the Choice of Court Convention threatens, rather than protects, the autonomy
of commercial parties and mandates recognition of judgments notwithstanding
significant unfairness in the national court proceedings that produced them.
A. The New York Convention: A Suitable Paradigm?
As discussed above, the Choice of Court Convention is modelled in
signiﬁcant respects on the New York Convention and the highly successful
legal regime which that treaty provides for international commercial
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.148 In particular, as also discussed
above, like the New York Convention, the Choice of Court Convention seeks
to enhance the autonomy of commercial parties to select forums for
resolution of their cross-border disputes and to facilitate the recognition of
judgments resulting from choice-of-court agreements.
Despite the potential signiﬁcance of the Choice of Court Convention,
there appears to have been little or no serious consideration in drafting the
Convention as to whether the New York Convention, and the international
arbitration process it governs, provide a suitable model for international
choice-of-court agreements and national court judgments.149 In fact, there are
very substantial grounds for questioning whether it is wise, in the context of
a global convention, to treat choice-of-court agreements and national court

See supra pp. 14, 17, 19–22.
As noted above, there was minimal involvement of international arbitration authorities in
the negotiations of the Choice of Court Convention. In any event, there is no apparent evidence of
analysis regarding the suitability of the New York Convention as a model for the Choice of Court
Convention.
148
149
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judgments in the same manner as international commercial arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards.
First, it is unfortunate, but equally undeniable, that a substantial number
of national courts are highly unsuitable forums for the resolution of
international commercial disputes. In a signiﬁcant number of jurisdictions—
amounting to well more than half of the countries that are potential
candidates for ratiﬁcation of the Convention—basic standards of integrity,
independence and competence are seriously compromised. As discussed
below, this conclusion is demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence from
neutral and non-partisan sources, as well as by consistent anecdotal evidence
from experienced international counsel. These facts are vital to consider in
assessing the wisdom of a global treaty that is open to ratiﬁcation by all states
and that makes the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments
substantially easier than hitherto was the case.
Despite the obvious diﬃculties in obtaining data (of intentionally
wrongful activities), there is a substantial body of empirical evidence that
documents the extraordinarily high incidence of judicial corruption around
the world.150 Thus, litigants in a substantial number of jurisdictions report
direct experiences with judicial corruption in between 25 and 75% of all cases.
Transparency
International,
a
highly-respected
anti-corruption
organization,151 reports that, in 2019, 30% of respondents from all jurisdictions
believe that “most” or “all” judges are corrupt, with signiﬁcantly higher
percentages in Africa, Latin America and Russia;152 the United Nations
150 See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER:
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICAN 12 (2019) (hereinafter Transparency Barometer) (27% of North
African and Middle Eastern respondents view judges as corrupt); Council of Europe, Corruption
Risks in Criminal Process and Judiciary (2009) (reporting on the corruption risks present in the four
basic court proceedings); World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, (2020) (measuring the rule of law
in practice around the world); International Bar Association, THE INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION JUDICIAL INTEGRITY INITIATIVE: JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AND CORRUPTION 19-20
(2016) (hereinafter IBA, Initiative) (ﬁnding that bribery and undue political inﬂuence are the most
frequently reported types of corruption in judicial systems and that judges may accept or demand
bribes especially where economic interests of a company are at stake); Franziska Rinke et al., Corrupt
Judges—Threat to the Constitutional State, KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG 6–10 (2021) (noting how
common judicial corruption is in Latin America and how widespread judicial corruption is in Asian
countries as well) (hereinafter Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Report); Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk,
Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial Reform, 18 WISC. INT’L L.J. 353, 353–
55 (2000) (discussing the consequences of corruption when it appears in the judiciary and noting
that every country, regardless of political tradition, culture, or socio-economic status, has
experienced bribery, misappropriation of funds and misuse of political position).
151 Transparency International has published a “Global Corruption Barometer” annually since
2003, as part of Gallup’s Voice of the People Survey. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL
CORRUPTION BAROMETER 243 (2007).
152 CORALIE PRING, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PEOPLE AND CORRUPTION: CITIZENS’
VOICES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 5 (2017).
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Development Programme reports that 24% of respondents worldwide
reported having paid bribes to the judiciary in the preceding year;153 and the
International Bar Association reports that more than 75% of respondents (in
a global study) had direct, recent experience with judicial corruption.154
Evidence of judicial corruption is worldwide, aﬀecting judicial systems in
every part of the world: “corrupt judges are a global problem.”155
Transparency International’s 2011 Annual Report found that, globally, almost
half of those surveyed (forty-six percent) perceived their judiciary as
corrupt.156 In one study, respondents reported that forty-two percent of Latin
American and Caribbean judges are “involved in corruption,”157 with eighty
percent of participants in Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru describing the
judicial system as corrupt.158 Another study reported that respondents regarded
roughly eighty-five percent of national court judges in Africa as corrupt, with
some ten percent believing that all such judges are corrupt.159 Likewise, a
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung report concludes that, in Asia, “the ability to secure
justice can often be a question of who you know and how much you can pay,”160

153 See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, A TRANSPARENT &
ACCOUNTABLE JUDICIARY TO DELIVER JUSTICE FOR ALL 11 (2016) (noting that in a survey
covering 95 countries, 24% of respondents reported having paid bribes to judiciary within year
preceding interview).
154 IBA, Initiative, supra note 150, at 19–20 (reporting rates of corruption in excess of 75% of
respondents with recent experience with direct judicial corruption in numerous jurisdictions).
155 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, supra note 150, at 7. See also TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 11 (2007) (twenty-one percent
of participants having contact with judiciary in Africa reported having paid a bribe; eighteen percent
in Latin America; ﬁfteen percent in Asia-Paciﬁc; and ﬁfteen percent in Newly Independent States);
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2013, at 15, 17 (2013) (ﬁnding in a
global survey of 107 countries that the judiciary was ranked as among the third most corrupt
institutions; on average, thirty percent of participants in 20 countries reported having paid a bribe
to judiciary).
156 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2011 34 (Rachel Beddow & Michael Sidwell
eds., 2012); see also CORALIE PRING & JON VRUSHI, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL
CORRUPTION BAROMETER: LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN: CITIZENS’ VIEWS &
EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION 13-14 (2019) (ﬁnding that forty-two percent of participants in 18
Latin American countries think the judiciary is corrupt).
157 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER: LATIN AMERICA & THE
CARIBBEAN: CITIZENS’ VIEWS & EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION 14 (2019); Konrad-AdenauerStiftung, supra note 150, at 8 (“Judicial corruption is an everyday occurrence in Latin America . . . .”).
158 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report, supra note 155, at 12.
159 Afrobarometer 2008/09 and Afrobarometer 2016/18 (studies show approximately eleven
percent of participants believe all national judges are corrupt, 21–23% believe most judges are corrupt
and 44–50% believe some judges are corrupt). See also Transparency International, Global Corruption
Report, supra note 155, at 11 (twenty-one percent of participants having contact with judiciary in
Africa reported having paid a bribe).
160 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, supra note 150, at 10. See also Transparency International, Global
Corruption Report, supra note 155, at 11 (ﬁfteen percent of participants having contact with judiciary
in Asia-Paciﬁc reported having paid a bribe).
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while corruption is also widely-reported in many European jurisdictions.161
Indeed, a number of the United States’ largest trading partners have particular
reputations for judicial and other forms of corruption.162
No less serious than, and often related to, judicial corruption is the lack
of judicial independence in many jurisdictions. Empirical reports by nongovernmental organizations, including the World Justice Project, Freedom
House and Heritage Foundation, report that, in an alarming number of
countries, judicial independence is entirely or largely lacking, with indicia of
independence falling, rather than increasing, in recent years.163
Countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe rank
particularly poorly on many indicators of judicial independence (correlating
with signiﬁcant incidences of judicial corruption).164 A number of European
states also lack basic assurances of judicial independence. In the words of one
recent study by the European Commission:
The level of perceived independence has decreased in nine Member States
over the past year and in a few Member States, the level of perceived judicial
161 See, e.g., COUNCIL EUR., CHALLENGES FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
IMPARTIALITY IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE INFORMATION
DOCUMENTS 95 (Mar. 24, 2016) (“Eurobarometer 397 found in its survey in 2013 that overall

twenty-three percent of inhabitants in EU member states assumed that the taking and giving of
bribes was widespread in courts . . . . Most negative were perceptions in Bulgaria (ﬁfty-eight
percent), Slovenia (ﬁfty-eight percent), Croatia (ﬁfty-seven percent) and Slovakia (ﬁfty-six
percent).”); EUR. NETWORK COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND OF THE PROSECUTION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
2015 46 (2015) (signiﬁcant percentages of judges reporting that, in past two years, they believed
judges had taken bribes).
162 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2–3 (2020)
(noting that in a survey of perceived levels of corruption in the private sector in 180 countries, Russia
ranks 137/180; Mexico ranks 130/180; China and India rank 80/180; Brazil and Egypt rank 106/180);
see also Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1996–
97, 56 (“Systemic corruption nurtures local criminal organizations and has helped to convert major
trading partners such as China, Mexico, and Russia into crime-exporting states.”); Tom Blass,
Combating Corruption and Political Influence in Russia’s Court System, in TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT, supra note 155, at 31-34.
163 See generally, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2017–2018 (2018) (annual
report on rule of law); see also HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2021 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM:
KEY FINDINGS OF THE 2021 INDEX, (2021) (annual report on economic freedom, including judicial
eﬀectiveness and government integrity); see also, generally MICHAEL J. ABRAMOWITZ, FREEDOM
HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018 (2018) (annual report on good governance, including rule
of law); see also, Siri Gloppen, Courts, Corruption and Judicial Independence 68 (Tina Soreide et al,
2013); Maria Dakolias, Court Performance Around the World: A Comparative Perspective, 2 YALE HUM.
RTS & DEV. L.J. 87 (1999).
164 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 8-9 (2017–18). The rule of law index
conducts surveys in 113 countries, based on eight factors including constraints on government
powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory
enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. In the survey, “China ranks 75/113, Mexico 92/113,
India 62/113, Russia 89/113, Brazil 52/113 and Egypt 110/113.”
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independence remains very low (below thirty percent) . . . Despite reform
eﬀorts in a number of Member States to enhance judicial independence,
developments raise concerns in a few of them. They range from concerns
about the capacity of councils for the judiciary to exercise their functions to
more structural concerns over an increasing inﬂuence of the executive and
legislative branch over the functioning of the justice systems, including
constitutional courts or Supreme Courts.165

More generally, a World Economic Forum survey of 137 countries
reported that more than half of all jurisdictions scored poorly (below average)
on a scale of independence,166 while other respected reports reach equally
harsh conclusions.167 Low levels of judicial independence are of particular
concern given the frequency with which state-owned entities, or politicallyinﬂuential local businesses or individuals, participate in contemporary
international commerce.168
Finally, basic levels of competence are demonstrably lacking in many
national court systems. In many jurisdictions, judges are poorly trained, badly
compensated and under-resourced, while often confronted with intolerably
heavy caseloads.169 “[M]any judges [outside of developed democracies]
choose to conform with the expectations of their superiors because they lack
training about what the law requires, or they are accustomed to accepting

165 Commission Communication on the 2020 Rule of Law Report: The Rule of Law Situation
in the European Union, at 8, 10 COM (2020) 580 ﬁnal (Sep. 30, 2020); see also European
Commission, The 2017 Justice Scoreboard (2017) COM 167 ﬁnal (Apr. 10, 2017).
166 KLAUS SCHWAB & SAADIA ZAHIDI, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, Judicial Independence
Chart (2007); World Economic Forum, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 12–13 (2020).
Moreover, the perception of judicial independence declined by about 4.6% in G20 economies in the
past decade. Id.
167 See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 6–7 (2017–18) (showing dramatic
diﬀerences in adherence to the rule of law among diﬀerent jurisdictions); see also WORLD JUSTICE
PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX (2020), https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-anddata/wjp-rule-law-index-2020 (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (“The WJP Rule of Law Index 2020 shows
that more countries declined than improved in overall rule of law performance for a third year in a
row, continuing a negative slide toward weakening and stagnating rule of law around the world. The
declines were widespread and seen in all corners of the world.”); see also FREEDOM HOUSE,
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018, supra note 161, at 1-2 (2018) (categorizing twenty-ﬁve percent of
states as Not Free, and thirty percent as Partly Free; citing “period characterized by emboldened
autocrats [and] beleaguered democracies.”).
168 See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR
CORPORATIONS 774-75 (2d ed. 2003).
169 See Amélie Arvidsson & Emelie Folkesson, Corruption in the Judiciary: Balancing
Accountability and Judicial Independence 12 (May 28, 2010); see also Dakolias, Performance, supra note
148, at 88 n.4; John Owen Haley, Judicial Reform: Conflicting Aims and Imperfect Models, 5 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 81, 96 (2006).
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direction from senior executive branch or judicial branch oﬃcials.”170 The lack
of judicial competence is frequently associated with increased corruption: as
an EU study reported with respect to EU Member State courts, “another
substantial cause of corruption practices in courts [is the] low level of the
judges’ professional education . . . prior corruption experience or lack of real
practical experience.”171 In addition to empirical evidence, external and
internal counsel with experience in international dispute resolution almost
uniformly agree that judiciaries in a substantial number of countries fail to
display basic levels of competence.
Given these characteristics of national court proceedings in numerous
jurisdictions, substantial care should be exercised in prescribing any global
system for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, including
the recognition of judgments in proceedings based on forum selection
agreements. It is true that commercial parties can generally be relied upon to
select—and should have the autonomy to select—suitable forums for the
resolution of international business disputes.172 Nonetheless, it is also true
that all developed legal regimes include both limits on the parties’ autonomy,
including for forum selection agreements,173 and guarantees for procedural
fairness in the dispute resolution process.174
These considerations are directly applicable in assessing the wisdom and
suitability of the Choice of Court Convention. The widespread lack of
judicial integrity, independence, and competence in many jurisdictions,
outlined above, provide powerful arguments against permitting foreign
judgments to be readily recognized and enforced, including in cases based on
choice-of-court agreements. Those factors mean that, in a substantial number
of cases, recognizing a foreign judgment means giving eﬀect to serious denials
of justice and procedural unfairness or, at a minimum, recognizing judgments
lacking in elementary attributes of diligence and quality.
In this respect, the New York Convention and the international arbitral
process do not provide a suitable paradigm for the recognition and enforcement
of national court judgments. That is because, as detailed below, the
international arbitral process contains a number of vital safeguards against the
risks of denials of justice and procedural unfairness that exist in many national
170 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY &
GOVERNANCE, GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 27
(2002).
171 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CORRUPTION RISKS IN CRIMINAL PROCESS AND JUDICIARY 199200 (2009).
172 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974). See also GARY BORN & PETER RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 447–48 (6th ed. 2018).
173 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 170, at 456.
174 BORN, supra note 63, at 3821-22, 3826-34; U.S. Const. Amends. V & XIV; Charter of the
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47.
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court systems. These protections are not present in either national court
proceedings or the regime established by the Choice of Court Convention.
Thus, in contrast to national court proceedings, in which judges are
selected by local oﬃcials or randomly, international arbitral proceedings are
conducted and decided by arbitrators chosen by or for the parties in
individual cases.175 The parties’ role in selection of the decision-makers in
individual cases makes the risk of foreign government interference highly
unlikely.176 The parties’ involvement in selection of the arbitrators also
signiﬁcantly reduces the risks of corruption or lack of substantive
competence: parties are able to select arbitrators who have both integrity and
competence (particularly given that arbitrators are virtually always selected
after a dispute arises, when the expertise relevant to resolving the parties’
dispute is known177). Consequently, despite the substantial numbers of
international commercial and investment arbitrations that are conducted each
year, there are virtually no recorded instances of corruption by arbitrators.
Moreover, all leading international arbitration regimes provide robust and
eﬀective mechanisms for ensuring the independence and impartiality of
individual arbitrators.178 Both commonly-used institutional arbitration rules
and virtually all national arbitration legislation uniformly require that
arbitrators be “independent and impartial,”179 while providing eﬀective
procedural mechanisms, administered by independent arbitral institutions,
175 The process of selecting a tribunal oﬀers unique opportunities to the parties, which are
distinct to arbitration. Parties may, and often do, select a tribunal which includes experts in a
particular substantive discipline (e.g., insurance practitioners, construction lawyers/experts,
maritime lawyers, or commodities practitioners) or arbitrators with speciﬁc language, technical,
cultural, and other abilities or experience. See BORN, supra note 63, at 1766.
176 National arbitration legislation almost uniformly provides that local courts may only
consider challenges to arbitrators in arbitrations seated on national territory or (less uniformly)
conducted pursuant to the procedural law of the relevant jurisdiction. With regard to other
arbitrations, seated abroad and conducted under the procedural law of another state, local courts
have no entitlement or power to remove arbitrators. BORN, supra note 63, at 2079-80.
177 BORN, supra note 63, at 1766-67.
178 The duties of independence and impartiality are an inherent and vital aspect of the
arbitrator’s adjudicatory role, which are expressly set forth in virtually all national arbitration
legislation and institutional arbitration regimes. These duties include both a personal obligation of
impartiality (which requires the arbitrator to be free of subjective biases, predispositions, or aﬃnities
that interfere with fairly and impartially deciding the parties’ dispute) and an objective obligation
of independence (which requires the arbitrator to be free of personal, contractual, institutional, or
other relationships that would compromise his or her independence). These duties also include the
obligation not just to be impartial and independent, but to conduct oneself and the arbitration
impartially, treating both parties equally and fairly. BORN, supra note 63, at 2132-36.
179 BORN, supra note 63, at 1891-1908. See also ICC Rules of Arbitration, Art. 11 (“Every
arbitrator must be and remain impartial and independent of the parties”); UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, Art. 11 (“When a person is approached in connection with his or her possible appointment as
an arbitrator, he or she shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justiﬁable doubts as to
his or her impartiality or independence.”).
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requiring disclosure of potential conﬂicts by arbitrators and permitting
challenges of arbitrators by parties.180 The New York Convention and
virtually all national arbitration statutes also provide for the possibilities of
both annulment and non-recognition of arbitral awards rendered by arbitral
tribunals lacking independence and impartiality; importantly, both
annulment and non-recognition proceedings occur in national courts and
provide external scrutiny of the arbitral process.181
Relatedly, and equally important, the procedures in international arbitral
proceedings are selected and tailored by the parties, with the arbitral tribunal
exercising procedural authority in the absence of agreement by the parties.182
Both the New York Convention and national arbitration legislation require
that arbitral procedures satisfy basic due process standards and to comply
with the parties’ procedural agreements183—with annulment and nonrecognition of arbitral awards by national courts, external to the arbitral
process, again available as sanctions for violation of these requirements.184
These various characteristics of the arbitral process are essential to the
New York Convention’s facilitation of the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards. First, these guarantees provide both reliable assurances as to
the underlying procedural fairness of the arbitral process and eﬀective
external protections in the (rare) event that these assurances are not realized.
That contrasts signiﬁcantly with the absence of such assurances, and, on the
contrary, the presence of endemic corruption and incompetence, in a very
substantial number of national court systems and proceedings.
Second, and relatedly, the parties’ right to control both the selection of
the arbitrators that decide their dispute and the procedures that those
arbitrators will apply, subject to enforceable due process guarantees, operates
to minimize the risks of governmental interference in the arbitral process and
to maximize the role of party autonomy in that process. In recognizing an
arbitral award under the New York Convention, a court gives eﬀect largely to
the parties’ own agreements and actions, not to the rulings of a foreign court
or government. In contrast, in recognizing a national court judgment under
the Choice of Court Convention, a court gives eﬀect primarily to the rulings
of a foreign court, based upon a foreign state’s procedural rules—which, as
discussed above, are frequently subject to grave doubts as to independence
and impartiality.
BORN, supra note 63, at 1961-64.
Id. at 1957-61.
Id. at 2309-15
BORN, supra note 63, at 2295-3000. See also New York Convention, Arts. V(1)(b), (d);
UNCITRAL Model Law, Art. 19.
184 BORN, supra note 63, at 2322-25, 2330, 2351. See also New York Convention, Arts. V(1)(b),
(d); UNCITRAL Model Law, Arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), (iv) & 36(1)(a)(ii), (iv).
180
181
182
183
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The desire of the Convention’s drafters to “level the playing ﬁeld”
between international arbitration and national court litigation has a surface
rhetorical appeal. But that objective in fact counsels away from accepting the
basic logic of the Choice of Court Convention. International arbitration is a
consensual process, dominated by the parties and regulated by strict,
enforceable guarantees of independence, impartiality, and fairness, applied as
external checks on the arbitral process by both annulment and recognition
courts; national court litigation is predominantly a non-consensual process,
taking place within a single legal system, with uncertain and frequently
unreliable assurances of independence, integrity, or fairness. Levelling the
playing ﬁeld does not mean treating these two processes, or their results, the
same; it should instead mean treating them diﬀerently.
Put concretely, why should U.S., Canadian, Australian, Swiss,
Singaporean, Ghanaian, Uruguayan or other courts commit to recognize all
foreign judgments—including judgments of courts in Russia, China,
Venezuela, Iran, the Congo, and Nicaragua—in the same basic way that they
recognize international arbitral awards? In the latter case, courts give eﬀect
to largely independent, expert and fair decisions concerning commercial
disputes, made by arbitral tribunals whose members are selected by the
parties themselves, applying procedures also chosen by the parties
themselves, with external supervision provided by both arbitral institutions
and annulment and recognition courts; a robust, pro-enforcement legal
framework makes eminent sense in that context, as nearly 70 years of
experience under the New York Convention has demonstrated. In the former
case, courts would be required to give eﬀect to judgments that are frequently
rendered by courts that are neither independent, competent nor fair, and that,
at the same time, are subject to no external scrutiny; the historic safeguards
of private international law rules in most states, which only permit
recognition of foreign judgments after reasonable careful scrutiny of their
fairness, make eminent sense in these circumstances.
On other occasions, the Hague Conference has acknowledged, by both
word and deed, that the judiciaries in a large proportion of countries around
the world lack the integrity, independence, and competence to justify
recognition of their judgments, even where those judgments were plainly
made pursuant to an indisputably legitimate jurisdictional base. The 1971
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments included, in Article 21, a provision that the Convention would
apply only where two Contracting States had agreed to its application on a
bilateral basis.185 Similarly, the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition
185 Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter 1971 HAGUE CONVENTION), Art. 21 (“Decisions
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and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments included, in Article 29, a provision
allowing states to opt-out of the Convention’s application as to any other
Contracting State.186 In both cases, these provisions applied even where
jurisdiction over the judgment-debtor was undisputed (and indisputable),
including where it was established by consent.187 Likewise, in both cases, the
reason for these provisions was pervasive doubts about the integrity,
independence and competence of courts in many countries188—which led to
rendered in a Contracting State shall not be recognized or enforced in another Contracting State in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding Articles unless the two States, being Parties to this
Convention, have concluded a Supplementary Agreement to this eﬀect.”).
186 Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil or Commercial Matters (hereinafter 2019 HAGUE CONVENTION), Art. 29.
187 1971 HAGUE CONVENTION, Arts. 10(5) (“if, by a written agreement or by an oral agreement
conﬁrmed in writing within a reasonable time, the parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the
court of origin disputes which have arisen or which may arise in respect of a speciﬁc legal
relationship, unless the law of the State addressed would not permit such an agreement because of
the subject-matter of the dispute”); 2019 HAGUE CONVENTION, Art. 5(1)(e) (“the defendant
expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings in
which the judgment was given”).
188 This is the case for both the 2019 Hague Convention and the 1971 Hague Convention. For
the 2019 Hague Convention, see Lucas Clover Alcolea, The 2005 Hague Choice of Court and the 2019
Hague Judgments Conventions versus the New York Convention: Rivals, Alternatives or Something Else?, 6
MCGILL J. DISP. RES. 185, 213–14 (2019-2020) (the 2019 Hague Convention opt-out provision has
the “unfortunate eﬀect of further undermining the uniformity intended by the Convention”; David
P. Stewart, The Hague Conference Adopts A New Convention On The Recognition And Enforcement Of
Foreign Judgments In Civil Or Commercial Matters, 113(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 773, 780 (2019) (“This
provision reﬂected a concern, driven by the prospect of widespread adherence to the Convention,
that contracting states might be bound to recognize and enforce judgments from other states whose
legal systems were considered likely to produce biased, unprincipled, or defective judgments.”);
Ning Zhao, Completing A Long-Awaited Puzzle in the Landscape of Cross-Border Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments: An Overview of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention, 30 SWISS. REV.
INT’L & EUR. L. 345 (2020) (“The second condition establishes a special ‘opt-out’ mechanism,
enabling a Contracting State to object to the establishment of a treaty relation with another
Contracting State . . . . Introducing this mechanism was to address certain States’ concerns
regarding allegedly systemic lack of due process in other States.”).
For the 1971 Hague Convention, see Ronald Brand, The Circulation of Judgments Under the Draft
Hague Judgments Convention, U. OF PITT. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 2019-20, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334647 (2019) (“The structure of the 1971
Judgments Convention demonstrates that countries may be hesitant to ratify a judgments
convention which allows any other country to join and automatically receive reciprocal beneﬁts.”);
Catherine Kessedjian, Is the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 A Useful Tool for Companies Who Are
Conducting International Activities?, 1 NEDERLANDS INT’L PRIV. REV. 19, 23 (2020) (“[Article 1(2)]
shows that States do not trust each other and their courts. . . . lack of trust is conﬁrmed by the
bilateralisation system inserted in Article 29. The procedure chosen here is diﬀerent from the classic
bilateralisation, whereby a convention has eﬀect among two States only if they have ‘accepted’ each
other as partners by a separate ‘positive’ agreement (see the 1971 Hague Judgments Convention, Art.
21).”); Wenliang Zhang & Guangjian Tu, The 1971 and 2019 Hague Judgments Conventions: Compared
and Whether China Would Change Its Attitude Towards The Hague, 2020 J. INT’L DISP. SETT. 11,
614, 618 (citing scholars who characterize the 2019 Hague Convention’s opt-out mechanism as
“inverse bilateralisation”).
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insistence on provisions allowing Contracting States to opt out of application
of the Convention as to such states.
These provisions underscore the gravity of concerns about the integrity and
competence of courts in many jurisdictions. In both the 1971 and 2019 Hague
Judgments Convention, states rejected provisions that would have required
them to recognize judgments from all states, precisely because of doubts about
the reliability of many national judicial systems. States did so in cases of both
choice-of-court agreements and other types of unequivocal consent to a state’s
jurisdiction: in each case, the lack of judicial integrity, independence, and
competence in many countries overrode deference to consent to a state’s
jurisdiction. The same conclusions apply, with equal force, under the Choice of
Court Convention: notwithstanding a valid choice-of-court agreement, there is
no justification for recognizing judgments from courts whose integrity and
independence are suspect.
There is also no justiﬁcation for adopting the Choice of Court
Convention, notwithstanding the foregoing criticisms, on the theory that
commercial parties will never (or seldom) agree to choice-of-court provisions
selecting courts lacking integrity and competence. That rationale was rejected
in the 1971 and 2019 Hague Judgments Conventions, on the correct grounds
that states should not facilitate the judgments of states whose judicial systems
lack integrity, independence, and competence, notwithstanding a party’s
consent. That rationale also ignores the increasingly ambitious and eﬀective
eﬀorts of states—including China, Middle Eastern states, Singapore and
elsewhere—to support local courts as dispute resolution centers, through
strategic initiatives (like China’s Belt and Road project189), the insistence of
state-owned (and other) enterprises on local courts, and through vigorous
marketing.190 In practice, forum selection provisions selecting jurisdictions
that lack minimal assurances of integrity, independence, and competence are
common and increasing.191
189 See, e.g., A Belt-and-Road Court Dreams of Rivalling the West’s Tribunals, THE ECONOMIST
(June 6, 2019) (“In the law courts of Communist China, power and political control count for more
than fairness.”).
190 See, e.g., Pamela Bookman, The Adjudication Business, YALE J. INT’L L. 239-57 (2020);
Matthew Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial Dispute
Resolution, 60 Va. J. Int’l L. 225 (2020).
191 See, e.g., Interamerican Trade Corp. v. Companhia Fabricadora de Pecas, 973 F.2d 487 (6th Cir.
1992) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Brazil); Braspetro Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA), Inc.,
240 F.Appx. 612 (5th Cir. 2007) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Brazil); Mendes Junior Int’l
Co. v. Banco Do Brasil, SA, 15 F.Supp.2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (choice-of-court agreement specifying
Brazil); Asoma Corp. v. M/V Southgate 98 Civ. 7407 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (choice-of-court agreement
specifying Korea); Glyphics Media, Inc. v. M.V. “Conti Sing,” 02 Civ. 4398 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (choiceof-court agreement specifying India); World Vacation Travel, SA, de CV v. Brooker, 799 So.2d 410
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Mexico); Kanner v. Pan American
Assistance, Inc., 807 So.2d 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (choice-of-court agreement specifying
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Importantly, this conclusion does not mean denying eﬀect to international
choice-of-court provisions or national court judgments based on such
agreements. Rather, it means ensuring that the characteristics of national
court litigations are taken into account in deciding whether and how to
recognize forum selection clauses and foreign court judgments. In particular,
the considerations outlined above argue for maintaining the safeguards
provided by historic private international law regimes which require
exercising caution in recognizing international choice-of-court agreements
and, more acutely, foreign court judgments.
B. The Choice of Court Convention: Party Autonomy and Procedural Fairness
As discussed above, given the underlying differences between international
arbitration and national court litigation, there are serious grounds for
questioning whether the New York Convention’s model is an appropriate
paradigm for the Choice of Court Convention. Even apart from this basic
question, however, there are additional, at least equally serious, grounds for
doubting the wisdom of the terms of the Choice of Court Convention which
were ultimately adopted. These grounds focus on the Convention’s treatment
of issues of party autonomy and procedural fairness, particularly as compared
to the New York Convention’s treatment of these issues.
1. Consent and Party Autonomy
There is no dispute that the related principles of party autonomy and
consent are fundamental to contemporary private international law regimes
and, in particular, to matters of international dispute resolution. It is
foundational that both international commercial arbitration subject to the
New York Convention and judicial proceedings subject to the Choice of
Court Convention are based on consent:192 absent a valid arbitration
agreement or forum selection clause, there can be neither a legitimate
international arbitration193 nor a national court litigation properly subject to
the Choice of Court Convention.194 Indeed, as noted above, proponents of

Colombia); Union Bancaire Privee v. Nasser, 300 A.D.2d 49 (1st Dept 2002) (choice-of-court
agreement specifying Brazil); Turnkey Projects Resources v. Gawad, 198 So.3d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Nigeria); Ogorodnikov v. Dikker, N.J. Super.
Unpub. 2016 LEXIS 3351920 (N. J. Super. Ct. 2016) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Russia);
Batbrothers LLC, v. Paushok, 60 Misc.3d 1205 (S. Ct. N.Y. 2018) (choice-of-court agreement
specifying Russia).
192 See Report, supra note 13, at 809; BORN, supra note 63, at 3881.
193 New York Convention, Art. V(1)(a).
194 Convention, Art. 6(b).
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the Convention emphasize that it is intended to “protect party autonomy”195
and “remov[e] obstacles to productive commercial relations, which are best
served by party autonomy.”196
Party autonomy does not, however, mean giving effect to every alleged
international arbitration clause or forum selection agreement. Rather, respect
for party autonomy means giving effect to those dispute resolution agreements
that commercial parties have in fact validly concluded. As a consequence, the
provisions of both the Choice of Court Convention and the New York
Convention that govern the treatment of challenges to the existence, validity
or scope of dispute resolution agreements—and hence the parties’ consent to
a particular forum for adjudication—are of central importance.
Contrary to the claims of the Convention’s proponents, the Choice of
Court Convention does not parallel the New York Convention’s treatment of
international arbitration agreements in this respect. Under the New York
Convention, the existence, validity or scope of an arbitration agreement can
generally be challenged at three separate stages: (a) in challenges to the
validity of the arbitration agreement, in both the arbitral proceeding and
litigation in the arbitral seat (and often elsewhere);197 (b) in challenges to an
arbitral award in annulment proceedings in national courts which supervise
the arbitral process in the seat of the arbitration;198 and (c) in challenges to
recognition of the arbitral award in proceedings in foreign courts outside the
arbitral seat.199 Importantly, the results of one of these challenges in a
particular national court system (or the arbitral proceedings) will ordinarily
not have preclusive eﬀect in other jurisdictions.200 As a consequence, parties
will not be required to arbitrate, nor bound by an arbitral award, unless
several independent inquiries into the existence and scope of valid consent to
arbitrate have been satisﬁed, including inquiries by both the arbitrators
themselves and by national courts in the recognition forum.
Importantly, the Choice of Court Convention dispenses with inquiries into
the existence of valid consent to a choice-of-court agreement that would
parallel those of the New York Convention. As discussed above, the existence
and validity of a choice-of-court agreement may be challenged under Articles
5 and 6 of the Convention—generally paralleling Article II of the New York
Convention.201 Critically, however, if such a challenge is made, and rejected by
Schulz, supra note 14, at 267.
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 12.
BORN, supra note 63, at 1139-41, 1145-49. See also UNCITRAL Model Law, Arts. 8, 16(3).
BORN, supra note 63, at 3434-37, 3450-62. See also UNCITRAL Model Law, Arts.
34(2)(a)(i), (iii).
199 BORN, supra note 63, at 3765-77. See also New York Convention, Arts. V(1)(a), (c).
200 BORN, supra note 63, at 3797-3808, 3995-4000.
201 See supra pp. 15–19.
195
196
197
198
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the putatively chosen legal system, then no further avenues for inquiry into the
existence or validity of the agreement are possible in any other judicial forum.
As a consequence of changes that were made to Article 9(a) of the Choice
of Court Convention late in the negotiating process,202 if the court putatively
chosen by a choice-of-court agreement has previously decided that the
agreement exists and is valid under the chosen court’s law, then the requested
court, where a judgment is sought to be recognized and enforced, must accept
this decision: a judgment may be denied recognition if “the [choice-of-court]
agreement was null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court,
unless the chosen court has determined that the agreement is valid.”203 As one
commentator explains:
The dependent clause in Article 9(a) qualiﬁes the availability of the review
of validity in the court addressed by creating a rule of preclusion. An explicit
determination by the chosen court that the choice of court agreement is ‘valid’
under its law cuts oﬀ review of the issue in the court addressed. Under the choice
of law rule in the Convention, whether a choice of court agreement is ‘null
and void’ is measured by the law of the state of the chosen court, and when
the court with greatest expertise in that law has held the choice of court
agreement to be valid, all other courts are bound by that determination.204

Relatedly, Article 8(2) also provides that “The court addressed [in
recognition proceedings] shall be bound by the ﬁndings of fact on which the
court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by
default.”205 Thus, even if the chosen court has not decided on the existence
and validity of the choice-of-court agreement, Article 8(2) makes its factual
determinations binding in subsequent recognition proceedings.206 In any
event, if the chosen court has not decided that the choice-of-court agreement
202 The draft of Article 9(a) prepared by the Working Group (then Article 7(a)) in March 2003
replicated the New York Convention approach to the validity of dispute resolution agreements. See
Preliminary Result on the Informal Working Group on the Judgment Projects 6 (Hague Conf. on
Priv. Int’l Law, Preliminary Document No. 8, 2003), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaﬀ_pd
08e.pdf. The Special Commission subsequently introduced the existing text of Article 9(a) during
meetings held in April 2004. See Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreement Proposal by the Drafting
Committee (Hague Conf. on Priv. Int’l Law, Working Document No. 110 E, 2004),
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_wd110_e.pdf.
203 Convention, Art. 9(a) (emphasis added).
204 BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 111 (emphasis added). The same commentary also
notes that the determination by the chosen court need not take the form of “an explicit ﬁnding to
that eﬀect.” Id. In practice, there will be very few circumstances in which the chosen court will not
explicitly or implicitly uphold the existence and validity of the choice of court agreement. And,
where no such determination is made, it will virtually always be as a consequence of waiver by the
judgment-debtor.
205 Convention, Art. 8(2).
206 Id., Art. 8(2).
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exists and is valid, it will virtually always be because the judgment-debtor did
not object to the agreement’s validity in the chosen court proceedings—
almost certainly resulting in a waiver of any subsequent jurisdictional
objection, including under Article 9.207
The consequences of these provisions of the Choice of Court Convention
are profound. Their eﬀect is to give the national legal system putatively
chosen in a choice-of-court agreement the sole authority to decide on the
existence and validity of that agreement, without the possibility of
subsequent review in recognition proceedings in any other forum. That is a
striking contrast to the New York Convention, where recognition courts are
explicitly granted the authority by Article V(1)(a) to deny recognition based
upon the absence of a valid arbitration agreement—notwithstanding an
arbitral tribunal’s ruling that such an agreement existed and, in addition,
notwithstanding an annulment court’s decision to the same eﬀect. Given the
central importance of consent and party autonomy to both international
arbitration agreements and choice-of-court agreements, the Convention’s
elimination of Article V(1)(a)’s safeguard is highly problematic: it creates a
very real risk of parties being forced to litigate in, and being bound to
judgments by, courts to whose authority they never validly consented.
The Choice of Court Convention’s treatment of issues of consent is also
a striking contrast to existing U.S. law. Under both the 1962 Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act208 (“UFMJRA”) and the 2005 Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act209 (“UFCMJRA”), the
recognition court must deny recognition to a foreign judgment if it
determines that the rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction.210 Among
other things, §5(a)(3) provides that personal jurisdiction existed if the

Id., Art. 9(a).
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1963)
(hereinafter UFMJRA). Roughly a third of all states (31 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the
District of Columbia) have adopted some version of the UFMJRA; 18 of these states have also
adopted the UFCMJRA (typically without repealing their original enactment of the UFMJRA),
with the result that 13 states have adopted only the UFMJRA, while 25 states have adopted either
the UFCMJRA or both the UFMJRA and the UFCMJRA. Compare Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, (last visited Apr. 29, 2021)
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=9c11b007-83b2-4bf2a08e-74f642c840bc with Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION, (last visited Apr. 29, 2021) https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=ae280c30-094a-4d8f-b722-8dcd614a8f3e (hereinafter ULA, FCMJRA).
209 2005 UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2005), 13 U.L.A. pt. 2 at 18 (Supp. 2011) (hereinafter UFCMJRA). Half of all states (25
states and the District of Columbia) have adopted some version of the UFCMJRA. See ULA,
FCMJRA, supra note 230.
210 UFCMJRA, §4(b)(2) (“the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant”). See id. Comment 6; id. §4(c)(5) & Comment 9. See also UFMJRA, §4(b)(2) (same).
207
208
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judgment debtor submitted, in a valid forum selection agreement, to the
rendering court’s jurisdiction, but makes clear that it is for the recognition
court to determine whether a valid forum selection agreement exists.211 As
the Comments to the UFCMJRA provide:
Subsection 5(a)(3) provides that the foreign court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant if the defendant agreed before commencement of the proceeding
leading to the foreign-country judgment to submit to the jurisdiction of the
foreign court with regard to the subject matter involved. Under this provision,
the forum court must find both the existence of a valid agreement to submit to the foreign
court’s jurisdiction and that the agreement covered the subject matter involved in the
foreign litigation resulting in the foreign-country judgment.212

In contrast, under the Choice of Court Convention, the recognition court
is required to accept the decisions of the rendering court as to the existence,
validity, and scope of a putative choice-of-court provision, thereby
eliminating the existing safeguards for consent that exist under U.S. law, and
again posing the very real risk that parties will be bound to judgments by
courts to whose authority they in fact never validly consented.
The Choice of Court Convention’s treatment of consent is subject to
additional, serious criticisms, which are also of substantial practical
importance. Under Article 9 of the Convention, there is no provision for
denying recognition based upon the chosen court’s excess of authority,
including by deciding disputes that are not within the scope of the parties’
choice-of-court agreement. In particular, there is no analog to the text of
Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention, and parallel annulment
211 UFCMJRA, §5(a)(2) (“the defendant, before the commencement of the proceeding, had
agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter involved”).
See also UFMJRA, §5(a)(3).
212 UFMJRA, §5, Comment (emphasis added). U.S. courts have consistently conducted
independent inquiries into the existence, validity, and scope of forum selection clauses in recognition
proceedings. See Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 943 A.2d 573, 580 (Me. 2008) (no deference
to foreign court’s determination that forum selection agreement applied); Bank of Montreal v. Kough,
430 F. Supp. 1243, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (parties only agreed that the law of British Columbia would
apply, not that defendant submitted to jurisdiction of British Columbia’s courts); John Galliano, S.A.
v. Stallion, Inc., 15 N.Y.3d 75, 80 (N.Y. 2010) (independently assessing existence and validity of
“agreement’s forum selection clause”). See also Clientron Corp. v. Devon IT, Inc., 35 F.Supp.3d 665,
684 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“the grounds for nonrecognition in the UFCMJRA contemplate that a
recognition court will independently review whether a foreign proceeding was contrary to an
agreement between the parties”) (emphasis added); Diamond Oﬀshore (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Haaksman,
355 S.W.3d 842, 847 (Tex. App. 2011) (Dutch judgment should not be recognized because Dutch
court wrongly refused to apply forum selection agreement which provided courts of Bermuda with
exclusive jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. h (1987)
(“When parties to a contract select an exclusive forum (whether a court or arbitral tribunal) for any
dispute that may arise between them, courts in the United States are not required to recognize a
judgment rendered by a diﬀerent forum”).
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provisions of national arbitration legislation, which permits a recognition
court to deny recognition where the arbitral tribunal made an award that deals
“with a diﬀerence not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration.”213
This is again a deeply problematic treatment of issues of consent. In
practice, disputes very frequently arise as to the scope of both arbitration and
forum selection agreements.214 Under the New York Convention, an arbitral
tribunal (and an annulment court) does not have the sole authority to resolve
such issues; rather, objections to the scope of the tribunal’s authority may be
raised in subsequent recognition proceedings under Article V(1)(c), providing
a critical safeguard for the parties’ autonomy. As with challenges to the
existence and validity of choice-of-court agreements, however, the
Convention eliminates Article V(1)(c)’s protections—leaving the chosen
court, of any Contracting State, as the sole judge of the scope of its own
jurisdiction. Again, this does not protect, but undermines, party autonomy.
Furthermore, the treatment of non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements
in Article 3(b) is also inconsistent with concepts of party autonomy. As
discussed above, Article 3(b) is a “deeming” provision which provides that “a
choice of court agreement which designates the courts of one Contracting
State or one or more speciﬁc courts of one Contracting State shall be deemed
to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.”215 As
also discussed above, this rule reverses historic (and current) common law
presumptions, including in the United States—which are that choice-of-court
clauses are non-exclusive.216 Those presumptions were based, correctly, on
notions of party autonomy and served to avoid undue restrictions on the
general right of parties of access to justice and relief in any court with
jurisdiction over a dispute.217 The Convention overrides those considerations,
instead imposing the opposite presumption (that parties’ freedom of choice
and access to justice is limited), implemented through a relatively rigorous
requirement that parties “expressly provide” that their choice-of-court
agreement is non-exclusive.
It is understandable that the Convention applies only to exclusive choiceof-court agreements; as the Explanatory Report discusses, signiﬁcant
practical diﬃculties would result from extending the Convention to nonexclusive choice-of-court agreements. It is much less understandable,
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New York Convention, Art. V(1)(c); UNCITRAL Model Law, Art. 34(2)(a)(iii).
See BORN, supra note 63, at 3889-92; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 170, at 117-18.
Convention, Art. 3(b).
See supra p. 12.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 18. See also Report, supra note 13, at 785.
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however, that the Convention goes further and deems all choice-of-court
agreements to be exclusive forum selection clauses. That deeming provision
is again a signiﬁcant intrusion on the autonomy of commercial parties to
structure their dispute resolution mechanisms in the manner they consider
most appropriate.
Finally, the suitability of the Choice of Court Convention’s treatment of
issues of consent in Articles 3(b), 8 and 9 is subject to even greater doubts
because of the considerations discussed above (concerning the integrity,
independence, and competence of many national courts).218 The Convention’s
elimination of any check on the jurisdictional determinations of the putatively
chosen court must be seen in circumstances where that legal system will, in many
cases, be of doubtful integrity, independence, and competence (in contrast to
arbitral tribunals, where the opposite is true, and, in any event, where
proceedings are supervised by the courts of the arbitral seat and recognition
forums). Eliminating Article V(1)(a) and V(1)(c)’s safeguard for ensuring valid
consent in these circumstances is a gravely flawed choice. Contrary to the
assurances of its proponents, the Convention’s provisions do not protect party
autonomy; they instead eliminate essential mechanisms for ensuring that the
parties’ autonomy is validly exercised and genuinely respected.
2. Procedural Fairness
No less important than respect for party autonomy in international
adjudication are requirements of procedural fairness. It is elementary that both
international commercial arbitrations subject to the New York Convention219
and judicial proceedings in national courts must be conducted in accordance
with basic principles of procedural fairness:220 the failure of a court or tribunal
to respect these principles constitutes a denial of justice and deprives its
rulings of both validity and legitimacy.221 Although materials promoting the
Choice of Court Convention appear oddly silent regarding the critical
importance of procedural fairness,222 these principles are beyond controversy.
Again, contrary to claims by its proponents, the Choice of Court Convention
does not parallel the New York Convention’s treatment of issues of procedural
fairness. Under the New York Convention, an award may be denied recognition
if “the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of
the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was
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See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 19-23.
New York Convention, Art. V(1)(b).
Convention, Art. 9(e).
See BORN, supra note 63, at 3821-23, 3834-35, 3875.
See generally BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13; Schulz, supra note 14.
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otherwise unable to present his case.”223 Moreover, as discussed above, many
aspects of the procedures in international commercial arbitration are a product
of the parties’ consensual arrangements, with the New York Convention again
providing for non-recognition of awards where there has been non-compliance
with these procedural agreements.224 These protections complement the parties’
explicitly guaranteed rights to “equality of treatment” and a “full opportunity to
be heard” under virtually all national arbitration legislation (including the
UNCITRAL Model Law) and the availability of annulment of awards for
violations of these guarantees of procedural unfairness.225
Together with the parties’ role in selection of the arbitral tribunal,226
Articles V(1)(b) and V(1)(d) of the Convention and analogous provisions
under national arbitration legislation in annulment proceedings provide
eﬀective, and essential, protections for the parties’ due process rights in
international commercial arbitration. At both the annulment and recognition
phase of arbitral proceedings, the procedural decisions of the arbitral tribunal
are subject to external scrutiny by national courts—in order to ensure that the
arbitral proceedings were conducted fairly.
Importantly, the Choice of Court Convention does not replicate these
safeguards for the procedural fairness of adjudicative proceedings. As
discussed above, Article 9(d) of the Convention permits non-recognition of
a judgment where it was “obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of
procedure,”227 defined as “deliberate dishonesty or deliberate
wrongdoing,”228 Although important, this provision is directed only to
deliberately fraudulent conduct—not to other denials of procedural fairness,
including through incompetent, negligent, inadvertent or biased decisionmaking by a national court: the provision provides substantially less
protection than the New York Convention’s protections, in Articles V(1)(b)
and V(1)(d), for the parties’ due process rights.
In addition, Article 9(e) of the Choice of Court Convention allows a
requested court to deny recognition of a judgment if “recognition or
enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the
requested State, including situations where the specific proceedings leading
to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of
New York Convention, Art. V(1)(b). See BORN, supra note 63, at 3821-28.
New York Convention, Art. V(1)(d). See BORN, supra note 63, at 3902-10.
See BORN, supra note 63, at 2334-44.
See id. at 1764-68.
Convention, Art. 9(d).
The Explanatory Report cites examples of fraud in connection with procedural matters:
“examples would be where the plaintiﬀ deliberately serves the writ, or causes it to be served, on the
wrong address; where the plaintiﬀ deliberately gives the defendant wrong information as to the time
and place of the hearing; or where either party seeks to corrupt a judge, juror or witness, or
deliberately conceals key evidence.” Report, supra note 13, at 831.
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procedural fairness of that State.”229 Article 9(e) of the Convention provides
more extensive protections than Article 9(d), but it too does not provide the
safeguards that exist in international arbitral proceedings subject to the New
York Convention.
First, Article 9(e) treats procedural unfairness as a subcategory of the
public policy of the requested state, prescribing an elevated and two-pronged
standard of proof—that recognition of a judgment be “manifestly
incompatible” with a state’s public policy—and requiring that the “speciﬁc
proceedings leading to the judgment” have been “incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedural fairness.” In Article 9(e), the
Convention appropriately seeks to restrain excessively broad applications of
the public policy exception.230 Nonetheless, by treating procedural unfairness
solely as a sub-set of public policy, Article 9(e) dilutes the speciﬁc due process
and other procedural protections that are provided by Article V(1)(b) and
Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention.
Second, Article 9(e) of the Choice of Court Convention also limits nonrecognition to cases where “the speciﬁc proceedings leading to the judgment”
were procedurally unfair. By so doing, the Convention deliberately forbids
inquiry into the fairness and independence of the legal system of the
Contracting State whose courts rendered the judgment in question.231 In the
words of one commentator:
[Article 9(e)’s] words were chosen with care. Review may be had in the court
addressed of something which may have occurred in the particular case
leading to the particular judgment for which recognition and enforcement is
sought. Article 9(e) is not an invitation to a broad scale attack on the nature,
character, or alleged conduct of the foreign judicial or legal system as a whole.232

This approach is seriously ﬂawed in the context of an instrument aspiring
to be a global convention, open to all states to ratify as Contracting States:
Article 9(e) mandatorily requires recognition of judgments rendered by
judicial systems that lack fundamental attributes of independence, integrity,
and competence—which is a characterization that, as discussed above,
describes a substantial number of states. That not only fails to protect private

Convention, Art. 9(e).
It is trite to observe that public policy is an unruly horse, posing risks of unprincipled and
unrestrained non-recognition of judgments (or awards). It is therefore appropriate to limit
application of the public policy exception to cases of “manifest incompatibility,” much as recognition
courts have done under the New York Convention. See BORN, supra note 63, at 3611-14.
231 See Report, supra note 13, at 825; BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 118.
232 BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 118 (emphasis added).
229
230
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parties from initial procedural unfairness in a foreign judicial proceeding, but
can require a subsequent denial of justice by the requested court.233
Detecting corruption or bribery in individual cases, as required by the
Choice of Court Convention, is extraordinarily diﬃcult. Although
widespread, oﬃcial corruption, particularly in judicial proceedings, is
deliberately, and often expertly, concealed; eﬀorts to detect, much less prove,
the existence of judicial corruption are notoriously challenging and very
seldom successful.234 In a cross-border context, demonstrating the existence
of corruption in an individual foreign judicial proceedings is even more
problematic, because of diﬃculties in obtaining evidence, language, cost, risks
of oﬃcial interference and the like. Likewise, proving the existence of
governmental interference in individual proceedings is extremely diﬃcult.235
As a consequence, the Convention’s provisions regarding procedural fairness
are very likely, in practice, to prove inadequate as safeguards against the types
of misconduct that are endemic in far too many jurisdictions.
The Choice of Court Convention’s treatment of issues of procedural
fairness also signiﬁcantly dilutes the protections that are available under
existing U.S. law. That is true notwithstanding the fact that the United States
is one of the most generous jurisdictions, and arguably the most generous
jurisdiction, in the world in its treatment of foreign judgments.236
Thus, under both common law standards and the 1962 UFMJRA, and
2005 UFCMJRA, U.S. courts may deny recognition of awards rendered by

233 Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 UCLA L.
REV. 44, 46-47 (1962) (“[T]he American court, by granting recognition, would itself deny due
process.”).
234 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY & TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION 74 (2009)
(“By deﬁnition corruption is covert and leaves no paper trail. Collecting evidence is therefore a
major challenge.”).
235 Evidence is diﬃcult to obtain due to a lack of cooperation by foreign courts, immunities
oﬃcials and judges and the fact that “[i]llegitimate political inﬂuence on judges take diﬀerent forms,
some [of which] are clearly illegal (bribes, blackmail, threats, violence/murder), while other forms
of undue inﬂuence stem from the ways in which relations between the judiciary and other arms of
government are organized, or reﬂect a legal culture where judges are expected to defer to political
authorities. Structural sources of political bias in the judiciary are related to procedures for
appointment of judges and judicial leadership; terms and conditions of tenure for judges; and
budgetary and financial regulations, including salaries and beneﬁts[.]” GLOPPEN, supra note 161, at
71 (emphasis in original).
236 See, e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
368 (1993) (“[T]he United States . . . appears to be the most receptive of any major country to
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments”); Statement of Professor Linda J. Silberman
before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, February 12, 2009 at 5 (“[R]ecognition and
enforcement of foreign country judgments has tended to be much more generous than the treatment
given by foreign courts to U.S. judgments.”).
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foreign legal systems that lack independence or impartiality.237 The vital
importance of these procedural protections is underscored by the Supreme
Court’s classic treatment of common law standards in Hilton v. Guyot:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a
court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings,
after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system
of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the
citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to
show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it
was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason
why the comity of this nation should not allow it full eﬀect, the merits of the
case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be
tried afresh . . . .238

Similar requirements are imposed by the UFMJRA and UFCMJRA.239
These requirements of existing U.S. law underscore the fact that U.S. and
other courts will not recognize foreign judgments that were not rendered
following a “full and fair trial,” upon regular proceedings, by a legal system
that could “secure an impartial administration of justice” for foreign
parties.240 These safeguards, paralleling those of Articles V(1)(b) and V(1)(d)
of the New York Convention are not incidental or merely “nice to have”: they
are essential attributes of any foreign ruling that is to be given binding eﬀect
in a legal system that respects the rule of law.
Despite the vital importance of procedurual fairness and regularity, the
Choice of Court Convention very signiﬁcantly dilutes the procedural
protections of both existing private international law rules in the United
States (and elsewhere) and the New York Convention. As discussed above,
237 Moreover, existing U.S. procedural protections against fundamentally unfair foreign
judicial proceedings have been criticized as inadequate. Montre D. Carodine, Political Judging: When
Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1230-31, 1234-36 (2007) (criticizing
UFMJRA and ALI Statute for not providing for non-recognition where proceedings were
procedurally unfair); RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 7(a) (Proposed Final Draft 2005).
238 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) (emphasis added).
239 See UFCMJRA supra note 231, § 4(b) (“A court of this state may not recognize a foreigncountry judgment if: (1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law”), §4(c)(7)
(permissive exception to deny recognition where “judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise
substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the foreign-country
judgment”); id. at (8) (permissive exception to deny recognition where “the speciﬁc proceeding in
the foreign court leading to the foreign-country judgment was not compatible with the requirements
of due process”); UFMJRA supra note 230 § 4(b) (“A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings
in suﬃcient time to enable him to defend”; or if the “(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud”).
240 Hilton, supra note 233, 159 U.S. at 202.
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there are serious grounds for questioning whether the New York Convention’s
protections, tailored to consensual proceedings designed principally by the
parties themselves, and subject to external review in annulment and
recognition proceedings for fairness, are appropriate models for proceedings
conducted in national courts, without external scrutiny.241 Even if the New
York Convention model were considered appropriate, however, it is extremely
diﬃcult to accept the proposition that its procedural protections should be
materially diluted for foreign judicial proceedings.
As with matters of consent, the Choice of Court Convention’s dilution of
safeguards for the procedural fairness of foreign adjudicative proceedings is
unwise. That is particularly true given the unfortunate, but widespread, lack of
judicial integrity, independence, and competence in many regions of the globe.
In these circumstances, there is no justification for diluting the procedural
protections of the New York Convention or other private international law
regimes; instead, the historic private international law approach, in the United
States and elsewhere, of subjecting the procedural fairness of foreign court
judgments to greater scrutiny and reserve than that provided by the New York
Convention for arbitral awards is both appropriate and necessary.
The Choice of Court Convention’s tepid concern with the procedural
rights of litigants contrasts markedly with its solicitude for notions of state
sovereignty. As discussed above, Article 9(c) of the Convention provides that
a judgment may be denied recognition where the document instituting
proceedings in the parties’ chosen court “was notiﬁed to the defendant in the
requested State in a manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles
of the requested State concerning service of documents.”242 As also noted
above, this limb of Article 9(c) has no parallel in either the New York
Convention or other international arbitration treaties.243
It is surprising that, while diluting the due process protections of
individual litigants, the Convention gives international eﬀect to the domestic
rules of a few European states, which have historically asserted that the
sending of notice of foreign proceedings oﬀends their judicial sovereignty.
Those rules, and the continued insistence of (a few) European jurisdiction on
application of those rules in an era of email and courier services, has rightly
been criticized as archaic and protectionist.244 It is unfortunate that the
Choice of Court Convention failed to take the opportunity to ameliorate the
unfairness and ineﬃciencies resulting from such rules; that the Convention
See supra pp. 24–42.
Convention, Art. 9(c).
Id.
Samuel Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and Enforcement of U.S.
Judgments Abroad, 44. N.Y.U. J. of Int’l L. & Pol. 965, 982-84 (2013).
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failed to do so while also diluting protections against genuine procedural
unfairness is yet more puzzling.
CONCLUSION
The Choice of Court Convention aspires to status as a worldwide charter
governing international forum selection agreements and national court
judgments and is promoted as a signiﬁcant milestone in the development of
international civil procedure and global governance. Despite these ambitions,
there are grave and fundamental defects in the Convention’s structure and
terms, which make it unsuitable for ratiﬁcation by either the United States or
other jurisdictions.
The Choice of Court Convention purports to transplant basic principles
from the New York Convention to the context of cross-border choice-of-court
agreements, notwithstanding substantial, and often decisive, diﬀerences
between the international arbitral process and proceedings in (many) national
courts. These diﬀerences raise serious doubts as to the suitability of the
Convention’s basic structure and objective. The Convention also omits or
dilutes critical safeguards that the New York Convention guarantees for both
the parties’ autonomy and the procedural integrity of the adjudicative
process. In doing so, the terms of the Convention again suﬀer from serious
ﬂaws which make it unsuitable for adoption on a global scale.
More fundamentally, the Choice of Court Convention does not advance,
and instead undermines, the autonomy of commercial parties with respect to
international dispute resolution. The Convention also does not ensure, and
instead jeopardizes, the fairness of international dispute resolution
mechanisms. In reality, the Convention seeks to replicate controversial EU
paradigms, based upon rigid conceptions of state sovereignty and judicial
cooperation, in a wholly diﬀerent context. That does not advance, and instead
threatens, both the objectives of contemporary private international law
regimes and the free ﬂow of international trade and investment.

